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I. INTRODUCTION
A user who gets sued becomes a defendant.1 My contribution to
this symposium on international and comparative user rights in
copyright explores how international intellectual property (IP) law
protects the rights and interests of defendants in IP enforcement
procedures.2 Procedural rights and safeguards are not a mainstream
1. . . .or prosecuted. Of course not all defendants are the kinds of ‘user’
whose interests we would wish to protect. But some are. And in a context where
many users are potential defendants, furthering the interests of defendants does
further the interests of users. ‘Defendant’ is not precisely right as the term here: (1)
in some cases, the ‘object’ of legal procedures is not alleged to be liable, but rather,
in a position to assist a right holder in taking action against a wrongdoer (e.g. in a
preliminary discovery action); (2) in other cases a person may be the object of
administrative procedures. However, the more accurate ‘enforcees’ is too
astoundingly ugly to use. See DENIS JAMES GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR
PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 101–03 (1996)
(introducing a general principle that a right is only taken seriously if there are
procedures to protect it. First order rights within a legal system justify a claim to
such procedures as are necessary to protect and uphold those rights. The litigant in
a civil action has a right to procedures by which the law will be applied accurately
to the facts, or at least that the contest between the parties be reasonably equal).
2. Defendants are not the only ones with an interest in the framing of legal
processes and remedies. Plaintiffs’ interests are discussed below. Moreover, the
State is itself a stakeholder in enforcement systems with its own distinct interests,
including at least: (1) ensuring the IP system serves intended policy purposes; and
(2) value for money invested in enforcement (e.g. court systems, police, customs);
as well as (3) promoting other public interests.
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part of the discussion of user rights in IP, which tends to focus on
exceptions and limitations. However, if we want IP law to account
appropriately for interests beyond those of IP right holders, i.e. those
of users, public institutions, and the society at large, we need to think
about IP systems from start to end. This means examining all parts of
the system, from the grant or recognition of rights, through rules
determining the scope of rights, and the conduct of legal processes,3
to provisional and final remedies.4 We need to think about how the
framing of both procedures and remedies can protect broader public
interests.
This paper offers a mapping and analysis of a range of procedural
safeguards found in the international legal framework governing IP
enforcement. Within the broader realm of international law, IP is
unusual in the extent to which international instruments address the
details of domestic legal process in relation to private rights.5
Therefore, IP provides an interesting case study in the interaction
between international law and domestic legal process and remedies.
International IP contains a broad range of procedural safeguards
and limits on remedies. These include general principles, such as the
requirement that enforcement measures should be fair and equitable,
and that procedures provide for safeguards against abuse.6 There are
3. This paper is concerned principally with legal processes which have the
purpose of applying authoritative legal standards: chiefly, civil and criminal
proceedings around IP enforcement, and equivalent administrative systems
implicating enforcement of rights (e.g. seizure of goods at the border, which is
typically an administrative process). Grant and revocation processes are of less
(direct) interest here. See GALLIGAN, supra note 1, at 24-31 (asserting “processes
are classified according to whether their purpose is: (i) to apply authoritative legal
standards; (ii) to decide as the official thinks best; (iii) to reach agreement between
the parties; (iv) to decide by voting; (v) to decide by fiat or decree . . . (vi)
investigation and inquiry, and (vii) proceduralism and participation.”).
4. See Carys Craig, The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright Law:
Authorship, Reward and the Public Interest, 2 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 425, 425
(2005) (arguing similarly that relying on exceptions to protect the public interest is
too late: that public interest considerations must be considered at the stage of
subsistence).
5. Apart from specific contexts, such as within the European Union, the
author is unaware of other areas of private law where procedures and remedies are
similarly dealt with at a supra-national level; see X.E Kramer and C H van Rhee
(eds) CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD (2012) (discussing the
challenges of procedural harmonization within the European Union).
6. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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also detailed rules regarding the availability of remedies, the
considerations relevant to making court orders, as well as specific
built-in protections and rules that directly protect the interests of
defendants in legal proceedings.7 These may seem prosaic, but in the
real world of actual and prospective court proceedings, rules of
evidence, standards and burdens of proof, the availability of
provisional remedies, and final remedies are all important to actual
and potential defendants.8 ‘What happens if I get sued?’ is an
obvious question for anyone proposing to interact with IP-protected
material. Thus, the framing of procedures and remedies can
determine whether users like the transformative artist or the health
NGO will fight or, quite rationally, fold at the threat of litigation.
They affect the calculations of a risk-averse public institution
considering digitizing their archive of wartime photographs and
letters. Additionally, procedures govern results that matter from a
public interest perspective: whether generic drugs risk being seized
en route,9 or whether a website suddenly disappears.10 In other
words, procedures and remedies can be as significant as the drafting
of substantive IP law in determining how punitive IP rules are in
practice.11
art. 41 Apr. 15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“Procedures concerning
the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. They
shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits
or unwarranted delays.”).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, No. 1051/2014, Federal
Court of Australia [Fed. Ct. of Aust’l] (Apr. 7, 2015) (providing an example of a
case where procedural safeguards prevented action being taken against potentially
infringing individuals: the court refused to authorize discovery which would have
identified alleged infringers as a result of a number of due process-related
concerns).
9. See Bryan Mercurio, ‘Seizing’ Pharmaceuticals in Transit: Analysing the
WTO Dispute that Wasn’t, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389, 398, 406-07 (2012)
(outlining India’s complaints over European seizures of generic pharmaceuticals,
which were raised with the World Trade Organization but ultimately did not
proceed to a decision).
10. Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and
the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 687-717 (2014) (describing laws and
systems by which the U.S. government has ‘seized’ domain names as a response to
infringement).
11. See Kimberlee Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges Concerning
Enforcement and Civil Procedure in IP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP A LEX SPECIALIS? 195-96 (Graeme Dinwoodie

(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANT RIGHTS

215

This paper also maps the development of safeguards over time,
with a focus on international instruments involving the United States.
The picture is simultaneously heartening and disturbing. On the
positive side, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)12 sets out a detailed and mostly
mandatory framework on IP enforcement that, while implementing
an extensive and strong set of remedies, also explicitly respects due
process, fair trial, and (to a lesser extent) the framing of appropriate
remedies. TRIPS includes both high-level principles pertaining to
due process and trial, and specific mandatory rules that ensure fair
treatment for the objects of legal and administrative procedures.13 In
relation to remedies, TRIPS requires their existence, but leaves room
for legislatures and courts to adjust those remedies to serve the
public interest and the exigencies of particular cases.14 In short,
TRIPS contains many safeguards to protect defendant rights and
interests. However, more troubling is the fact that, as this article
shows, not all of these protections are repeated in more recent
international IP instruments.15 The safeguards are disappearing, and
we may risk losing the hard-won balance established in the 1990s.
Part II of this paper outlines the importance of this project: the
tendency to include more and more detailed rules relating to
enforcement in international legal instruments, and to make IP
litigation simpler and cheaper for IP owners. These trends make
defendant safeguards more important. Part II also discusses whether
procedural safeguards are an appropriate part of the discourse around
user rights in copyright. Part III identifies and analyzes key
procedural safeguards and limits on remedies found in the various
international instruments. Part IV briefly maps the trends around
procedural rules and safeguards in recent international instruments,
and discusses the legal implications of the tendency to leave certain
ed. 2015) [hereinafter Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges] (claiming that
“the rules with the most impact on how punitive IP is in practice could well be
rules of evidence, standards and burdens of proof, and provisional remedies, as
well as the rules which govern the progress of cases and the conduct of trials”); see
generally W. R. Cornish et al, Procedures and Remedies for Enforcing IPRS: The
Proposed Directive, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 447, 448 (2003).
12. See TRIPS, supra note 6.
13. See id. Part III.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
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safeguards out, and Part V concludes. Annexure 1 provides a table
identifying the various safeguards and whether they are in, or out, of
the international instruments discussed in this paper.

II. WHY WE NEED TO PAY ATTENTION TO
DEFENDANT SAFEGUARDS
A. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL AND
REMEDIAL SAFEGUARDS

It is important that we focus on safeguards in IP enforcement
because developments in international IP law are simultaneously
making protecting defendants more important while also putting
them at greater risk. Under the shadow of an apparent IP
infringement crisis, recent years have seen a massive growth in the
number, scope, and geographic reach of international instruments
requiring extensive IP protection, as well as civil and criminal
enforcement of IP.16 This trend is neither smooth17 nor universal. By
contrast, the World Intellectual Property Organization has had a
significant focus on exceptions and limitations, which to date has
seen the successful conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate
Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.18 Nevertheless, it is an
important and observable trend.
The inclusion of detailed enforcement provisions in international
agreements is a recent phenomenon. The treaties which provided the
international IP framework for most of the 20th Century, namely the
1886 Berne Convention in copyright and the 1883 Paris Convention
16. See Peter Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
975 (2011); see also Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Kind of International
IP Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 839, 876 (2011) [hereinafter Weatherall,
ACTA] (describing one IP enforcement treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, and situating it as part of a more general trend).
17. See LTC HARMS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CASE BOOK 476-482 (2008) (discussing that the failure of ACTA is one
example of a reversal of this trend).
18. Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind,
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013 [hereinafter
Marrakesh Treaty]. There are also ongoing discussions relating to both library use
and educational use of copyright content, and, more broadly, there is WIPO’s
Development Agenda.
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in relation to industrial property, left general enforcement and
remedial measures as (mostly) matters for national law.19 TRIPS
changed this two decades ago by mandating a range of procedures
and remedies in twenty articles relating to enforcement.20 It is worth
pausing a moment to note how very remarkable this development is.
Few treaties, and certainly few global treaties, would descend so far
into domestic legal processes, so as to dictate, in detail, procedures
and remedies to be accorded in an area of essentially private law.
Outside the context of regional instruments, such as those within the
European Union (EU), it is difficult to identify equivalent attempts to
dictate court and administrative processes.
As will become evident through the course of this paper, the
TRIPS enforcement rules were less than IP owner lobbyists had
sought, making them from a right holder perspective TRIPS’
“Achilles’ Heel”.21 The United States in particular has pushed to
reinforce and extend these rules through subsequent agreements. In
the early 2000s, a series of bilateral and regional preferential trade
agreements negotiated by the United States (and EU) contained a
scattergun collection of specific TRIPS-plus provisions on
enforcement; the EU also developed its own regional text in the form
of the EU IP Enforcement Directive.22 The text of the failed Anti19. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
opened for signature Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]. There is one important exception: both conventions require that
Member States give authorities the power to seize infringing copies: Berne
Convention art. 16(1) and (2); art. 13(3)); Paris Convention art. 10, 10bis, 10ter.
20. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41-61 (outlining the general obligations, civil
and administrative procedures and remedies, provisional measures, special
requirements related to border measures and the criminal procedures associated
with the enforcement of intellectual property rights).
21. See David Lange & Jerome Reichman, Bargaining Around the TRIPS
Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34-39 (1998) (criticizing the
shortcomings of the enforcement procedures in the TRIPS agreement). But see
David Fitzpatrick, Negotiating for Hong Kong, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY NEGOTIATIONS 285, 28991 (Watal Jayashree & Antony Taubman eds. 2015) (praising the enforcement
procedures in TRIPS. David Fitzpatrick was involved in the negotiation of the
enforcement provisions).
22. See Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29
April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195)
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Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), concluded in late 2010,
was more systematic and comprehensive.23 Today we appear to have
entered what some are calling the Age of the Mega-regionals:
proposed deep integration partnerships between countries or regions
with a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment.24
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),25 concluded in late
2015, would apply detailed enforcement obligations to countries in
the Asia-Pacific constituting some 40% of global GDP and 25% of
global trade.26 Other mega-regional agreements are currently under
negotiation, namely the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP)27 and Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP).28 Both (if concluded) seem likely to include at
16, 24 [hereinafter EU Directive 2004/48].
23. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature Oct. 1,
2011 (not in force) [hereinafter ACTA] (setting out a range of obligations relating
to IP enforcement). ACTA was negotiated and signed by Australia, Canada, the
EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the
United States. The European Parliament rejected ACTA, and it appears that
ratification has not been actively pursued in other signatories. The ACTA has not
reached the number of ratifications required to bring it into force.
24. See Tomas First, What Are Mega-Regional Trade Agreements? WORLD
ECON. FORUM (July 9, 2014), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/07/tradewhat-are-megaregionals (defining the concept of mega-regionals).
25. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Austl.
and the Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Can., Chile, Japan, Malay., Mex.,
N.Z., Peru, Sing., the United States and Vietnam, opened for signature Feb. 4,
2016 (not in force), ch.18, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/
tpp-full-text (last visited June 26, 2016) [hereinafter TPP].
26. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/pages/trans-pacificpartnership-agreement-tpp.aspx (last visited June 26, 2016) (describing the size
and importance of the markets covered by the TPP).
27. See generally Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP),
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited June
26, 2016) [hereinafter TTIP] (describing the TTIP as a trade agreement being
negotiated between the United States and the European Union).
28. RCEP is under negotiation between the ten Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar),
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam) and the six states with which ASEAN has existing FTAs (Australia,
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand); See generally Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensiv
e-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited June 26, 2016) (describing the
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least some enforcement-related provisions.29
As noted, the process of expanding IP enforcement rules is far
from smooth. One reason for undertaking the plurilateral
negotiations that led to ACTA was that efforts to initiate detailed
enforcement discussions at the multilateral level, in both the World
Intellectual Property Organization and World Trade Organization,
had stalled in the face of resistance particularly from developing
countries.30 Despite being negotiated among a ‘coalition of the
willing’, ACTA failed to garner support sufficient to bring it into
force.31 The TTIP, TPP, and RCEP are all beset by controversy, and
at the time of writing it is unclear which, if any, will eventually come
into force. Nevertheless, an explicit part of the TPP/TTIP/RCEP
agenda is to set future standards for other future negotiations. One
negotiator at the 2016 Fordham IP Conference described the TPP IP
chapter as ‘the new TRIPS.’32 These texts also reveal what will be
sought in future lobbying efforts and negotiations: despite its failure
to come into force, text from ACTA has surfaced in subsequent
negotiations, including for the TPP. Therefore, these initiatives
warrant critical attention. And every one of them contains extensive
enforcement provisions, requiring that the law of Member States
recognize a broad range of remedies and increase general deterrence
through the growth of punitive measures as a common element in
civil remedies.33 In this context, defendant safeguards are clearly
membership and purposes of RCEP).
29. See 2015 Oct 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L,
http://keionline.org/node/2472 (last visited June 26, 2016) [hereinafter RCEP
Draft] (mandating, in this leaked draft text, a range of enforcement provisions).
30. See generally Kimberlee Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text and the
Failures of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 229
(2011).
31. See Weatherall, ACTA, supra note 16, at 893-94 (positing that perceptions
toward ACTA have been widely negative despite improvements in transparency
and content. This “bad publicity” is due to the early exclusivity of ACTA and a
lack of early public involvement).
32. See Kimberlee Weatherall, Intellectual Property in the TPP: Is Chapter 18
the New TRIPS?, draft paper on file with author.
33. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74 (requiring pre-fixed or additional
damages), art. 18.74(9) (referring to the need for deterrence), and art. 18.74(12)
(detailing the destruction of infringing goods without compensation, as well as
implements used in creating infringements); See also Mark C. Stafford & Mark
Warr, The Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence, 30
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 123 (1993) (describing the difference between
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important.
Another impact of these international instruments is to adjust
procedural rules to make it easier to prosecute an infringement case.
For example, various treaty provisions seek to reduce the need to
prove elements of the case by presuming that copyright subsists by
proving it was authored by the person identified on published
copies;34 these provisions also provide for fixed or quasi-fixed
damages (statutory damages) that can be claimed without proof of
harm.35 Recent treaties also mandate that certain measures of
damages (such as retail price) be taken into account when assessing
damages,36 and seek to increase the efficiency of enforcement
through the use of provisional or pre-emptive seizure.37 Some of
these developments respond to genuine difficulties experienced by IP
right holders in effectively enforcing their rights against wrongdoers;
others respond to barriers that smaller enterprises in particular
encounter in dealing with the IP system. But an inevitable effect of
making acquisition and enforcement of rights easier and provisional
and final remedies stronger, is to increase the risk of misuse and

specific deterrence, which refers to the narrower objective of deterring the
individual or entity that is before the court from re-offending, versus general
deterrence which aims at deterring the population as a whole).
34. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.72(1) (requiring a presumption of
authorship); see also Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 15 (applying a similar
presumption). The presumption of authorship addresses the difficulties sometimes
experienced in documenting how copyright content was created, in a system in
which compulsory registration is not allowed under Berne art. 5(2), which is
imported into TRIPS via Article 9.
35. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74(6)(b) (requiring statutory damages);
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 446 (2009) (discussing
how statutory or pre-fixed damages were motivated in part by a desire to help
overcome difficulties that copyright owners in particular experience in providing
solid evidence of harm caused by copyright infringement).
36. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.4; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1; see
also United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art.
17.11.6(b), Jan. 1, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter AUSFTA]; EU Directive
2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13.1 (mandating, in each case, that certain measures of
harm, such as retail price, be taken into account when assessing damages).
37. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74(17) (requiring provisional measures in
relation to anti-circumvention laws); art. 18.75 (mandating provisional measures
including seizure of alleged infringements), 18.76 (requiring measures to allow
seizure of alleged infringements at the border).
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opportunism.38 Just as not every defendant is harmless or wellintentioned (some are counterfeiters), not every plaintiff is an
innovator or creator asserting clear and justifiable IP rights against a
competitor who is undermining their incentives to invest in more
invention and creation. Some are trolls.39
Procedural safeguards and limits on remedies can dramatically
influence both the dynamics of enforcement proceedings and their
outcomes. This is demonstrated by the recent proceedings in the
Australian Federal Court in Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd.40
This case involved the extended right of information, provided for in
many recent international instruments, which allows right holders to
seek access to information in the possession of a non-infringing third
party such as an online service provider that may identify an alleged
infringer.41 Under Anglo-Australian common law this order has
38. Cf. Kimberlee Weatherall, Ignoring the Science: What We Know About
Patents Suggests Dire Consequences from ACTA and the TPPA, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING
INTERESTS (Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds. 2013) [hereinafter Weatherall,
Ignoring the Science] (making this argument in a patent context).
39. See Michael Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive
Intellectual Property, 44 B.C.L. REV. 510, 520 (2003) (regarding factors that may
encourage ‘troll-like behaviour’); see also John Allison et al., Extreme Value or
Trolls on Top – the Characteristics of the Most-litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 32-33 (2009) (highlighting that remedies such as injunctions and damages
for profits lost are derived from consideration of the status of the enforcing party as
an active competitor in the market, which trolls are not); see generally Hugh
Laddie, The Insatiable Appetite for Intellectual Property Rights, 61 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 415, 415-16 (2008) (offering a brief overview of patent troll
proliferation and the reasons for their effectiveness).
40. See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, [2015] FCA 838 (holding
that it is impermissible for plaintiffs to demand access to users’ uploading activity
or to demand arbitrary, unnamed damages. Set the precedent that in order for
future rights holders to obtain preliminary discovery against ISPs they must follow
a stricter set of guidelines and clearly identify the damages sought. Note that
because Australia has no constitutional or statutory bill of rights, the Federal Court
was entirely reliant on principles relating to fair trial and due process); see also
Golden Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 723 (addressing similar
issues in the UK); Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe, [2015] F.R. 1364 (Can.
Ont.) (holding similarly that access to ISP information must be closely monitored
by the court to protect the privacy rights of users).
41. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (setting out an optional ‘right of
information’ confined to information in the hands of the infringer). ACTA contains
a similar optional provision in art. 11, as does the TPP in art. 18.74. An ISP is not
necessarily an infringer. But a right to information in the hands of a non-infringer
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historically been referred to as a Norwich Pharmacal order,42 or
preliminary discovery.43 The case involved an application by Dallas
Buyers Club LLC (DBC), which held copyright in the film Dallas
Buyers Club, for preliminary discovery against six internet service
providers (ISPs), and sought the names and addresses of the account
holders of 4,726 IP addresses it had detected BitTorrenting the film.44
The ISPs opposed the application on the basis that it would allow
DBC to engage in ‘speculative invoicing.’45 Justice Perram held that
the right holders were entitled to the information, but stayed the
order to produce to supervise its use.46 He foreshadowed imposing
conditions meant to protect the privacy of the affected account
holders47 and limit the use to which the information could be put; as a
is embodied in more recent instruments, including Article 8 of the EU IP
Enforcement Directive); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 27.4 (addressing
online service providers’ ability to identify infringing subscribers); see also TPP,
supra note 27, art. 18.82.7 (indicating a right to obtain information identifying
infringing subscribers, although not all parties would be bound to provide such a
right; the Canadian annex 18-E does not include an equivalent provision); see also
AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11.29(b)(xi) (mandating that both the US and
Australia provide for an extended right to information).
42. See Norwich Pharmacal Co v. Customs & Excise Commissioners, [1973]
UKHL 6, [1974] AC (HL) 133 (holding that when a third party has information
about unlawful conduct, a court can compel them to reveal that information and
assist the person whose rights have been infringed).
43. See Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth of Aust.) Order 7.22 (allowing order
for discovery to ascertain description of respondent, thus allowing rights holders to
protect their interests). Australia does not have a specialized mechanism for
seeking such information in its copyright law, but relies on pre-existing court
procedures. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (allowing a copyright holder to petition the
court to issue a subpoena to the internet service providers, ordering the release of
user information).
44. See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (holding that
litigation could continue against ISP users, however the court imposed strict
procedural safeguards to protect the privacy interests of users).
45. See Golden Eye, supra note 40, ¶ 36 (describing ‘speculative invoicing’ as
involving the sending of letters to internet subscribers whose IP address is alleged
to have been used for copyright infringement and whose names and addresses have
been obtained by means of preliminary discovery. The internet subscriber is
requested to pay a substantial sum bearing no relation to the actual damage caused
or costs, without the sender seeking to confirm that the internet subscriber was the
person responsible for infringement).
46. See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40.
47. In fact, Perram J never laid out the necessary privacy protections in detail:
the order lapsed before any such details were established. See Dallas Buyers Club,
1051/2014, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (holding that the privacy of users is of utmost
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preliminary step, these conditions required the applicants to produce
drafts of their proposed communications with alleged infringers.48
Courts in both the UK and Canada have imposed similar
conditions.49 Justice Perram refused to approve the drafts supplied,
which referred to additional punitive damages that might or might
not be awarded in any subsequent legal proceedings: this uncertainty
was problematic in the context of letters to users.50 The claimants
were unable to provide a letter that would both satisfy the judge and
achieve their own goals, and the order to produce information
ultimately expired without the stay ever being lifted.

B. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AND REMEDIAL
LIMITS IN USER RIGHTS DISCOURSE

From one perspective, the result in Dallas Buyers Club thwarted
the effective enforcement of copyright rights and hence undermined
the goals of international copyright law.51 An alternative assessment
is that the case demonstrates how procedural safeguards can temper
the stringency of over-extensive copyright rights.52 The gap between
these perspectives raises a fundamental question concerning the
legitimacy of treating procedural safeguards and limits on remedies
as a user rights issue. When applying remedies, should we only be
concerned with enforcement of substantive law, or can goals of
importance and therefore mandating that the court closely monitor the plaintiff’s
correspondence with users).
48. See id.
49. See Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe [2015] F.C. 1364 (Can.) (holding
that letters to potential defendants must first be submitted to the court to protect the
privacy rights of users); Golden Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC
723 (imposing a range of conditions to protect users).
50. See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (naming additional
punitive damages as “impermissible demands” that would not be allowed to
continue. The court allowed litigation for compensatory damages for the initial
infringement). Note that an implication of this is that the result might have been
different had Australian law provided for statutory damages.
51. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; TPP, supra
note 27, art.18.71.1 (highlighting the obligation to provide ‘effective’
enforcement); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 27.1; TPP, supra note 25, art.
18.82.1 (mandating the obligation to provide for effective enforcement in the
online context).
52. See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, supra note 40 (holding
allows for litigation to continue while procedural safeguards aim to prevent
frivolous lawsuits).
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copyright law such as promoting public access to knowledge and
culture be considered alongside the concerns of copyright owners
potentially harmed by infringement?
A user rights perspective regarding procedural safeguards and
limits on remedies could proceed as follows. Limits on both the
availability of enforcement procedures and the remedies granted are
necessary to ensure a balanced system of rights in response both to
the extension of stronger remedies and procedures in international
instruments and to the structure of IP rights. IP legislation frequently
grants the same strong exclusive rights and extended term to a broad
array of subject matters that we may need to treat differently in
practice.53 For example, copyright law confers the same exclusive
rights and the same 100+ years of protection to J. K. Rowling’s
Harry Potter series and yesterday’s email to the Dean. However, we
would not expect the same level of damages to follow from
quantitatively similar levels of infringement of both,54 nor the same
procedures. Preliminary seizure of alleged infringing copies of Harry
Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone and related evidence might be
appropriate pending legal action (at least where the infringer appears
to be operating commercially), but it would be much harder to justify
preliminary seizure of computers allegedly used to infringe an email. Furthermore, because IP rights are proprietary in nature, prima
facie liability for infringement is often determined without reference

53. See Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1575 (2003) (describing the general phenomenon of IP
rights which do not differentiate between subject matters, but also discussing
mechanisms in patent law – policy levers – which enable some tailoring of rights);
See Michael Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 845 (2006) (arguing that
intellectual property law protects the owner of each patented invention or
copyrighted work of authorship with a largely uniform set of exclusive rights).
54. See Patrick Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 306, 328 (2014) (arguing that compensatory damages
designed to redress harm suffered would be set at a different figure in the case of
infringement of these different materials – but ‘damages for monetary harm
suffered’ is the same remedy regardless of the difference in the final figure. The
point is more pressing however with non-compensatory remedies: punitive
damages might be justified in one case but not the other; other remedies such as
seizure and forfeiture of implements used in making infringing copies might also
be appropriate in one case but not the other).

(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANT RIGHTS

225

to intent or mental state.55 In short, describing certain conduct as
‘infringement,’ or a person as an ‘infringer,’ tells you very little
about the nature of the act, the harm it causes, or the moral
culpability involved. In a context where not all infringements are
created equal, we need mechanisms for tempering the otherwise
undifferentiated impact of substantive IP laws.56
An advocate of user rights would also recognize the need to think
beyond exceptions and limitations, which while important in
tailoring the law’s responses to infringing acts, is not a complete
answer to over-extensive IP rights. Leaving public interest
considerations until a person has already been branded a free-rider
and prima facie infringer, and requiring them to beg for forgiveness,
may be too late if the overall goal is to balance interests in the IP
system and give recognition to public interests in access to and reuse
of content.57 Exceptions place the onus on the defendant and burden
them with legal costs, not all of which are recoverable.58 As a result,
exceptions do not wholly overcome the risk for an impecunious
defendant who, faced with costs and procedures that may be stacked
against them, will settle unmeritorious claims or potentially avoid
questionable activity altogether if sufficiently risk averse.59 Further,
in the many countries which have specific (rather than open-ended)
copyright exceptions, factors relevant to the perceived justice of a
claim or penalty, such as the defendant’s mental state or intentions,
the public benefit, and the degree of harm to the IP owner, may not

55. This is true in the case of direct infringement; contributory and vicarious
liability in the US, or authorization liability in Australia and the UK, does take into
account the mental state or the actor. See id. (outlining the widespread and
orthodox belief that copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, but arguing that
this characterization is questionable).
56. Re the use of various ‘policy levers’ to create differentiation within the IP
system. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, 1641 (explaining how, in theory, the
United States applies a uniform patent system even though technological
innovation is anything but uniform).
57. See Craig, supra note 4, 435–36 (arguing that public interest must play a
role in determining the substance of copyright, if we are to balance the interests of
the producer and the interests of the public at large).
58. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, at 1638.
59. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, at 1624; see also Michael J. Meurer,
supra note 39, at 512-516 (outlining the various risks facing defendants in IP
litigation, and noting that certain problems – like weak but credible plaintiffs, and
uncertain rights – are more prevalent in IP litigation).
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be considered when determining whether an exception applies.60
Thus, in order to ensure that copyright enforcement serves the
purposes of copyright law, the public interest, and the interests of
justice to the infringer, we may require mechanisms other than
exceptions for adjusting legal consequences of infringement.
Another reason consideration of procedures and remedies might be
attractive for those concerned with user rights is a practical one:
international IP law imposes more constraints on States drafting
exceptions compared to the application of remedies. Most exceptions
across the major areas of IP law, which includes copyright, patent,
and trademark, must meet one or more formulations of a three-step
test.61 As discussed below, enforcement provisions in the treaties are
drafted quite differently and more flexibly.
For all these reasons, a user rights advocate might argue that states
should be able to condition the availability of enforcement
procedures and remedies according to their own conception of
societal interests in access and reuse of content, and courts and other
decision-makers also ought to be allowed to consider such issues in

60. Although the U.S. copyright exception for fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) takes
into account the impact of a defendant’s conduct on the market for the protected
work, many exceptions in countries like Australia and Europe have no provision
for considering this issue. See Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, Copyright and the
Digital Economy, 23, 88 (Nov. 2013), http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/
files/pdfs/publications/final_report_alrc_122_2nd_december_2013_.pdf
(reviewing Australia’s specific exceptions regime in copyright and pointing out
that while the fair use defence asks the ‘right questions’ – whether a use impacts
on the copyright owner’s market; and whether there is social benefit – Australia’s
exceptions leave no room for these considerations); Council Directive 2001/29,
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10(EC), # 5 [hereinafter EU Directive 2001/29] (setting out an
exhaustive list of exceptions which apply to certain copyright exclusive rights in
the European Union).
61. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 13 (setting out the three-step test in
copyright); c.f. Berne, supra note 19, art 9 (also setting out a three step test for
copyright, but applying that test only to works (not including sound recordings or
broadcasts), only to the reproduction right and requiring consideration of the
legitimate interests of the author, where TRIPS art 13 requires consideration of the
legitimate interests of the right holder). The three-step test in the World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 63 (WCT) (art 10.1) applies to works and protects authors’ interests; the
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (WPPT) (art 16.2) applies to
sound recordings and performances and protects the right holder).
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framing appropriate orders in particular cases.62 However, opponents
of such views – such as advocates of strong copyright – might
counter that debates over the appropriate scope of IP rights ought to
be addressed by the legislature when determining the scope of rights,
as opposed to in an ad hoc manner by courts.63 The legislature is
arguably better equipped to consider the various stakeholders and
determine the settings in substantive IP law, which will best promote
the interests of society. On this view, once the substantive law of
copyright has been fixed, the goal of legal procedure is only the
accurate application of copyright law to the facts, and remedies are
concerned only with the vindication of copyright owners’ duly
recognized rights.
In relation to legal process, this paper is not the place to delve into
the vast and venerable scholarly literature considering the role and
purposes of legal procedure and its relationship to justice and to
substantive law.64 A body of well-established legal theory holds that
correct application of the substantive law to the facts is not the only
goal or value in legal procedure.65 Several layers of values are
reflected in legal processes.66 These include ensuring that substantive
law (i.e. copyright) is accurately applied67 and other values such as
the following: standards of right treatment for individuals; ensuring
equal treatment and respect for all persons involved in legal
proceedings;68 and, at least in common law systems, ensuring that
62. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92
TEX. L. R. 517 (2014) (arguing for the consideration of public policy in framing
remedies in patent law, as it has been largely ignored thus far).
63. See Mark Mckenna & Mark A. Lemley, The Scope of IP Rights, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (presenting this as a possible argument, but
presenting an overall argument for court procedures to determine the scope of IP
rights, drawing inspiration from the Markman model in U.S. patent litigation).
64. The role of legal process has been a core concern of many of the great
legal theorists, including Jeremy Bentham, HLA Hart, Rawls, Finnis, and
Dworkin. See generally Galligan, supra note 1, (reviewing relevant literature).
65. See id. (finding this to be a common, albeit not universal view: there have
been scholars, such as Jeremy Bentham who have argued that the sole purpose of
procedural law is to enforce substantive law).
66. See id. at 6 (setting out a model for thinking about processes, reflecting
different values at different ‘layers’).
67. See id. at 58-59 (iterating that this reflects more than one goal in itself:
achieving the goals of the substantive law, and to serving a more general and
fundamental principle that people will be treated according to law).
68. See generally id. at Ch. 2 (discussing a range of values relevant to
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persons subject to legal proceedings have the opportunity and
capacity to participate in those processes.69 Some of these values are
recognized as part of the framework of human right to a fair trial
recognized in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)70 and in other human rights instruments.71
At times, these other values will be more important than correct
application of copyright law. One can agree or disagree whether the
scenario in Dallas Buyers Club was an example where the courts’
obligation to ensure fair use of procedures correctly trumped the
copyright owners’ desire for effective and efficient enforcement.
However, the fact that information was denied, meaning the IP
owner could not locate infringers to take action against them, is not
necessarily a failure of legal process, or unfair treatment of the
copyright owner.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that even if general process
values, such as fairness, equal treatment, and absence of bias, are
legitimate concerns for the courts, user and societal interests in
copyright, such as access to content and its reuse for worthwhile
public purposes, are not. On this view, concerns that copyright
protects too much, is too easily acquired, or treats as infringement
activities the social value of which outweighs any harm to the
copyright owner, are irrelevant to framing IP enforcement
procedures. Such an argument would be inconsistent, however, with
international IP law. TRIPS, ACTA, and the TPP all explicitly
reaffirm that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social

procedure).
69. R. S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for
‘Process Values’, 60 CORNELL L.R. 1 (1974); Lawrence Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); see Galligan, supra note 1, at 100
(discussing the value of participation as a value in legal processes).
70. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (including also the notion of
“innocent until proven guilty” and several other due process rights many deem
fundamental).
71. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 69, at 1.
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and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 72

In other words, it is legitimate to consider a full range of interests
and stakeholders in framing and applying enforcement provisions (at
least within the bounds of any mandatory language).73 Broader public
interests in access are reflected in the fact that provisions sometimes
restrict remedies that apply to institutions such as public libraries,
museums, and archives.74 While a state clearly could take the
position that its substantive copyright law strikes all the relevant
balances, and hence procedures and remedies ought to apply
universally, another state could equally take a different view.
It is also notable that both international and domestic IP laws
explicitly take into account policy issues close to the heart of
copyright owners, such as the need to deter infringement and provide
incentives for creativity. For example, international instruments
enjoin Member States to ensure that enforcement includes ‘remedies
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.’75 Domestic
copyright law in Australia makes a number of remedies with a
punitive element, in which the remedy is conditional on
consideration of other aspects of blameworthiness of the defendant
as well as the need to deter other infringers.76 If it is legitimate to

72. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7; see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.2; ACTA,
supra note 23, art. 2.3 (incorporating TRIPS art. 7).
73. See generally infra Part III. A.
74. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.68.1 (allowing Member States to limit
the criminal liability for circumvention of technological protection measures by
public interest institutions such as non-profit libraries, museums, archives,
educational institutions, and public non-commercial broadcasting entities).
75. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; see TPP,
supra note 25, art. 18.71.1. Note that ‘deterrence’ here could be interpreted to refer
only to specific deterrence – that is, deterring the particular infringer from
engaging in further infringements. Domestic systems around the world however
also explicitly take into account general deterrence; see also Austl. Law Reform
Comm’n, Copyright and the Digital Economy, 122 (Nov. 2013) (Austl.) (stating
that in awarding additional (i.e. punitive) damages, the court is required to take
into account ‘the need to deter similar infringements of copyright’); see also Panel
Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights,, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) ¶¶. 7.672, 7.679 [hereinafter USChina Panel Report] (outlining third party submissions to the WTO in relation to
the dispute between China and the United States over IP enforcement which
argued that deterrence in this context meant general deterrence).
76. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (stating that in awarding additional (i.e.
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take into account some aspects of copyright policy in framing
remedies – especially the interest in ensuring incentives for creation
by deterring widespread infringement – then it must be legitimate to
take into account the full range of public interests in copyright,
including by recognizing any public benefits arising from infringing
use. The position taken by user rights advocates is that concerns with
appropriate access to, and reuse of copyright content for a variety of
social and public purposes are as much goals of the copyright system
as the protection of creators, and the provision of incentives for
investment in creativity.77 Opponents could reject this premise, but
such rejection would fly in the face of widespread recognition by
governments and in treaty text that the goals of copyright extend
beyond supporting creativity.78

III. A PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF DEFENDANT
SAFEGUARDS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
If you look carefully and with a broad conception of what kinds of
things can operate as safeguards to protect the interests of individuals
and companies who become the objects of IP enforcement

punitive) damages, the court must consider the flagrancy of the infringement (s
115(4)(b)(i)) and the conduct of the defendant following infringement or the
allegation of infringement (s 115(4)(b)(ib)).
77. Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 841, 848-849
(1993) (“The point is not merely that the individual rights of authors must be
balanced against the social good. The Constitution stipulates that authors’ rights
are created to serve the social good, so any balancing must be done within the
overall context of the public good, i.e., between the specific aspect of the public
good that is served by intellectual property (‘the Progress of Science and useful
Arts’) and other aspects of the public good such as the progressive effects of the
free circulation of ideas”).
78. See Michael Blakeney, Guidebook On Enforcement Of Intellectual
Property
Rights,
Intellectual
Prop.
Research
Inst.,
(2005),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122641.pdf (discussing the
argument that broader public interests, such as access and reuse, are not a
legitimate concern of the copyright system.) It seems unlikely, however, that such
an argument would be mounted in the face of numerous multilateral treaties, which
affirm the relevance of broader public interests, including most obviously TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8, but also recent multilateral efforts such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2014
ATNIF 15 (not in force)).
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procedures, you will find many relevant rules, principles, and even
drafting styles scattered through various international IP instruments
which address enforcement-related issues: multilateral (TRIPS),
plurilateral (ACTA79/TPP), regional (the EU IP Enforcement
Directive), and numerous bilateral agreements. These safeguards
include the following, discussed in this section:80
1. The discretionary structure of the enforcement provisions;
2. Guarantees of fair and equitable process;
3. The principles of proportionality and effectiveness;
4. Other specific procedural rules:
Rights of review;
Rights to have measures expire or be revoked;
Rights to compensation for harm caused by measures wrongfully
imposed; and
5. Safeguards against abuse of rights and abuse of process.
It is important to note that some defendant safeguards are stated at
the level of general principle, while others are very specific.81 For
example, TRIPS includes a general obligation to ensure that
enforcement procedures are ‘fair and equitable;’82 it also specifies
that seizures of allegedly infringing goods at the border must be
released unless proceedings on the merits are commenced within 10
working days, extendable once.83 Both general and specific
79. See generally ACTA, supra note 23. The informed reader may wonder
why this paper discusses ACTA, which has not come into force and looks unlikely
to do so: supra note 23. ACTA is nevertheless worthy of analysis as the most
recent negotiation on enforcement in particular between the United States and EU,
meaning that it potentially foreshadows the Trans-Atlantic Investment Partnership
(TTIP) under negotiation between the United States and EU. The ACTA text also
influenced the TPP IP negotiations.
80. Note that the focus of this paper is on safeguards for defendant interests, as
more relevant to this symposium and user rights in IP. There are many safeguards
throughout the various international instruments promoting plaintiff interests, and a
number of the safeguards discussed in this section are equally applicable to
plaintiffs and defendants.
81. Guarantees of fair and equitable process, and principles of proportionality
and effectiveness, discussed below, are stated at a high level of generality. More
specific safeguards include rights of compensation, also discussed further below.
82. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2.
83. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 55.
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safeguards are important, for while specific safeguards provide
unambiguous bright line rules that are easy to implement, due
process and the principles pertaining to what constitutes a fair trial
are dynamic concepts which can evolve over time.84 The question
addressed in this Part is how these specific rules and general
principles protect defendant rights and empower states and domestic
courts to achieve justice in particular cases – and what has been
happening to these safeguards in more recent texts.

A. THE DISCRETIONARY STRUCTURE OF THE IP ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS

Current international IP enforcement provisions are almost
universally drafted in a very particular style to require that national
courts have the authority to take certain actions or make certain
orders. For example, TRIPS article 45.1 (Damages) states:
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer
to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the
right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that person’s
intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with
reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.85

All the enforcement provisions in TRIPS and many in recent
international instruments follow this formula, requiring that courts
and tribunals ‘have the authority’ to make orders.86 This is not an
obligation to exercise authority in every case.87 It is relatively rare for
the international provisions to set down when such authority ought to
be exercised or what limits a State must or could place on the
84. See James Spigelman, The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a
Fair Trial, 78 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 29, 41 (2004) (noting that the principle of a fair
trial allows courts to remain dynamic in determining what is regarded as fair,
especially in a criminal trial).
85. TRIPS, supra note 6, art 45.1 (emphasis added); see also ACTA, supra
note 23, art. 9.1-2, 9.4-5; TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.3 (providing similar
damages provisions).
86. ACTA, supra at note 23, art. 8.1; see TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.2-3
(establishing obligations to provide for provisional measures drafted in similar
terms), art. 18.74.2 (stating the power to issue injunctions in similar terms); see
generally TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 44.1, 50.1-3.
87. See US-China Panel Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 8.1; see also Appellate
Body Report, United States—Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998 , WT/DS176/AB/R (2 January 2002).
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exercise of such authority.88
This is a deliberate part of the design of enforcement provisions.
The open-textured drafting ensures that these enforcement provisions
accommodate a wide range of judicial and administrative systems,
and avoid the creation of a distinct procedural and remedial system
applied only to IP cases within the overall legal system of Member
States.89 Many domestic court systems will have well-established
principles to guide the legal process and the application of remedies;
these principles generally traverse multiple areas of law. This
drafting also represents a compromise between states who wanted to
promote genuinely effective enforcement, and states concerned with
preventing interference of international legal text, or WTO dispute
settlement decisions, into the details of domestic legal, judicial, and
penal systems.
The effect of drafting provisions in this way is to dictate the
availability, not the application, of procedures and remedies in
domestic courts. Although this does not directly guarantee
safeguards for defendants, it does enable a State interested in
promoting a balanced IP system to implement such safeguards. How
far a State could go in taking advantage of this flexibility is a subject
of some dispute. For example, there has been debate about whether
provisions requiring courts to have the power to award compensatory
88. Some provisions have some guidance. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art.
50.2 (specifying circumstances where provisional measures may be appropriate
inaudita altera parte: namely, where delay is ‘likely to cause irreparable harm to
the right holder’, or where there is a ‘demonstrable risk of evidence being
destroyed’).
89. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.5 and TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.4(a)
(providing that obligations pertaining to IP enforcement do ‘not create any
obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general’); see also
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 2.1 TPP, supra note 25,
art. 18.5 (providing that each member state is free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing IP treaty provisions within its own legal system and
practice. Drafting that ensures flexibility in the application of procedures and
remedies is consistent with this principle); see William R. Cornish et al.,
Procedures and Remedies For Enforcing IPRs: The European Commission’s
Proposed Directive, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 448 (2003) (arguing that an
important consideration here is that principles should be developed consistently
across a legal system – i.e. the same principles should govern the application of
procedures and remedies across IP and other kinds of private law such as contract,
tort, or corporate law).
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damages and injunctions for IP infringement90 require that those
remedies be available in all cases of infringement, or whether the
State can carve out certain cases. For example, in the U.S. Patents
Act, damages and injunctions are not available against a medical
practitioner (or related health entity) where the medical practitioner’s
performance of a medical activity constitutes an infringement of a
valid patent.91 Some commentators have argued that this provision is
inconsistent with remedial provisions like those found in TRIPS or
the TPP, or would be, except for text in those treaties that allows the
exclusion of patents for medical methods.92

These debates are important, but cannot be resolved here.93
Nevertheless, even if a state cannot entirely exclude remedies, the
architecture of the enforcement provisions still allows states to
protect defendant interests in legal procedures and qualify remedies.
90. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 44-45 (requiring Member States to
provide courts with the power to issue injunctions against infringers, and to make
damages awards to compensate right holders).
91. See Physicians Immunity Statute, 35 U.S.C. §287(c) (providing immunity
from suit for patent infringement with respect to a medical practitioner’s
performance of a medical activity).
92. See, e.g., Krista Cox, Patents and Doctors and the USTR TPP Text,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (2011) (criticizing the TPP draft for failing to
include an exception from patentability for surgical procedures, arguing that such
failure creates an ethical dilemma for surgeons and is incompatible with U.S. law).
93. Resolution of these arguments would depend both on the language of the
various remedial provisions, plus a consideration of other TRIPS Articles,
including in particular art. 41.1 of TRIPS, which requires that ‘enforcement
procedures as specified under this Part are available under their law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement. . .and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringements’ (emphasis added). See US-China Panel Report,
supra note 75, at ¶¶ 8.1-8.5 (considering these provisions). Note that the Panel did
not make findings on this and related arguments, as the focus of that dispute was
what acts China was required to criminalize (not prosecute, or deter). It might also
be possible to argue that absolute limits on remedies in relation to certain
infringements ought to be considered ‘limitations’ on rights that must satisfy the
relevant three step test.
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As discussed below, they provide policy space for the operation of
other safeguards. A state mindful of the need to promote public
interests in copyright could direct the courts, when determining final
remedies, to take into account factors such as the nature and extent of
access that members of the public have to copyright content, or any
public benefit arising from infringing use. It is also legitimate for
courts (and other decision-makers) to exercise discretion in the
course of IP enforcement proceedings.
Even though the open-textured drafting of enforcement provisions
may seem well-entrenched, not all international obligations are
drafted in this way. There have been occasional encroachments into
States’ and courts’ authority. For example, Article 13.1 of the EU IP
Enforcement Directive provides that Member States “shall ensure
that the competent judicial authorities, on application of the injured
party, order the infringer” to pay damages.94 Similarly, an early U.S.
proposal for the IP provisions of the TPP was framed in a way that
may have mandated statutory damages on the election of the right
holder. The leaked proposal, dated February 2011, included a
requirement that “[i]n civil judicial proceedings, each Party shall, at
least with respect to works, phonograms, and performances protected
by copyright or related rights, and in cases of trademark
counterfeiting, establish or maintain a system that provides for preestablished damages, which shall be available upon the election of
the right holder.”95 In one interpretation, only the plaintiff can decide
whether statutory damages will be awarded, although the court will
determine the amount awarded.96 This text was somewhat softened in
the final TPP text.97 Additionally, text in the Australia-United States
94. See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13.1.
95. See The complete Feb 10, 2011 text of the U.S. proposal for the TPP IPR
chapter, art. 12.4, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, March 10, 2011,
http://keionline.org/node/1091.
96. This assumes that statutory damages are framed as a range (as in the
United States), so that even if a plaintiff elects statutory damages the amount
remains to be determined. In the United States, a court might have oversight over,
rather than determine, damages awards, which are determined by the jury. See
TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.8 (noting that there may be limits to the State’s
freedom to set statutory damages rates: the Article requires that pre-established
damages must be set out “in an amount that would be sufficient to compensate the
right holder for the harm caused by the infringement, and with a view to deterring
future infringements”).
97. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.6-7 (giving a Party the option of
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Free Trade Agreement (‘AUSFTA’) allowed Australia to eschew
statutory damages in favor of its existing system of ‘additional
damages,’ but with a qualifier:
A Party may maintain a system of additional damages in civil judicial
proceedings involving infringement of copyright in works, phonograms,
and performances; provided that if such additional damages, while
available, are not regularly awarded in proceedings involving deliberate
acts of infringement where needed to deter infringement, that Party shall
promptly ensure that such damages are regularly awarded or establish a
system of pre-established damages as specified in sub-paragraph (a) with
respect to copyright infringement. 98

It appears that at least some States would like to revisit the
historical architecture of enforcement obligations in IP treaties, to
ensure more frequent application of the available remedies.

B. GENERAL GUARANTEE OF FAIRNESS AND EQUITY OR A FAIR
TRIAL

Another safeguard found in TRIPS and in most international IP
instruments considered in this paper is a mandatory obligation that
procedures concerning the enforcement of IP rights are fair and
equitable.99 The language of fairness and equity is apt to address two
fundamental principles100 commonly recognized in domestic systems

providing for statutory damages or additional damages. The provision on
additional damages retains the ‘traditional’ form of requiring that judicial
authorities shall have the authority to award such additional damages as they
consider appropriate (which could presumably be zero)); cf. TPP, supra note 25,
art. 18.74.9 (requiring that statutory (pre-established) damages, if provided, must
be available on the election of the right holder).
98. See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11.7(b).
99. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2; ACTA, supra note 23; 2004 E.U. Directive,
supra note 22; TPP, supra note 25 (providing provisions with differences in
drafting and coverage. ACTA art. 6(2) is confined to the implementation of ACTA
itself. TRIPS and the TPP require that any procedures aimed at IP enforcement be
‘fair and equitable.’ The EU IP Enforcement Directive obliges Member States to
‘provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the
enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive’, and it is
these procedures which must be fair and equitable: thus the obligation is not
confined to the procedures laid out in the directive itself).
100. See Spigelman, supra note 84 (discussing how not all jurisdictions
recognize constitutional or statutory human rights as such; thus in Australia, which
has neither a constitutional bill of rights nor (at a federal level) a statutory scheme
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and international human rights instruments, namely (1) the right to a
fair trial, and (2) rights to due process in the making of
administrative or executive decisions that affect a person’s rights or
interests.101 During the preparatory work on the TRIPS agreement,
various terms were used in individual country proposals: ‘natural
justice’ and ‘due process’ among them; however, the negotiators
recognized that, at the time, these were not international law
concepts, and that local judicial proceedings would vary
considerably.102 The term ‘fair and equitable’ is an umbrella term apt
across the full range of legal systems.
The necessary features of fair trial or administrative processes
cannot be exhaustively enumerated in the abstract: the essence of
these principles lies in their application in the infinite variety of
actual cases.103 Fairness in legal procedure is also an evolving
concept. It was not so long ago that rights to legal representation or
rights to be heard were not considered essential parts of a fair trial; 104
into the future, developing technology will require further
evolution.105 Certain elements are, however, commonly recognized
for the protection of human rights, it is arguably more appropriate to talk about the
principle of a fair trial and due process, recognized in the common law).
101. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, art. 14
(providing for equality before courts; reasonable grounds must be provided for any
distinctions).
102. During early negotiations, states put forward lists of procedural protections
they considered necessary, under various rubrics from ‘due process’ to ‘natural
justice and fair play.’ See U.S. proposal dated Oct 13, 1988
(MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1) pp12ff; see also European Communities proposal
dated May 30, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/31) pp4-5; Submission from Canada
dated Sept. 5 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/42); Communication from India dated
Sept 5, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/40); Proposal by Japan dated 12 September
1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/43); Communication from the Republic of Korea
dated Oct. 26, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/48); see also the Synoptic Table
produced by the Secretariat on enforcement provisions dated June 7, 1989
(collecting and synthesizing the early Japanese, EC and U.S. proposals).
103. Spigelman, supra note 84; Galligan, supra note 1.
104. See, e.g., J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
417–18 (1971) (noting the considerable disadvantages suffered by defendants prior
to the 19th century and outlining gradual introduction of pro-defendant reforms in
England, such as the right to representation (1836), the right to call witnesses
(1867) and even the right to give their own sworn evidence (1898)).
105. For example, expectations of documents being provided in electronic,
rather than paper form so that electronic search and analysis tools can be used
during trial preparation. More futuristically, to the extent that tools using artificial
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attributes of fairness: including an independent and impartial court or
tribunal; a public trial; notice of any charge, civil claim, or proposed
action affecting rights; time and facilities to prepare; access to
relevant evidence or information; rights to legal representation or
counsel; and rights to be heard and offer evidence in response to the
claim, charge, or proposed administrative action and any evidence
which may be the basis of a decision affecting a person’s rights.106
Some of these specific elements of fair trial and due process are
reflected in the specific provisions in TRIPS in Articles 41 through
43.107 Under Article 41 TRIPS, decisions on the merits (1) should
preferably be in writing and reasoned; (2) must be based only on
evidence on which the parties were offered the opportunity to be
heard; and (3) must be made available at least to parties without
undue delay.108 Judicial review must be available in respect of final
administrative decisions, and appeals from trial court decisions are
also required at least on points of law.109 Article 42, entitled ‘Fair and
Equitable Procedures,’110 requires that defendants have the right to
written notice of any claim, and timely and sufficiently detailed
information inclusive of relevant facts, and the legal basis for the
claim.111 It also requires that all parties have the right to
independently selected legal representation for all activities and in all
procedural stages, and prohibits onerous requirements for personal
appearances for any party. 112 Parties must have the right to present
relevant evidence; and confidential information must be protected

intelligence or data mining are developed to predict wrongdoing, process rights
and remedial limits will also need to evolve.
106. This incomplete list is drawn from Article 14 of the ICCPR (supra note
70), as well as the recent discussions in a recent report of the Australian Law
Reform Commission. See Australian L. Reform Comm’n, Traditional Rights and
Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, Report No. 129 (2016)
(focusing on chapters 8 (Fair Trial) and 14 (Procedural Fairness)).
107. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 41-43.
108. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.
109. See Spigelman, supra note 84 (arguing that parties to a proceeding shall
have the opportunity for judicial authority subject to jurisdictional provisions in
national laws concerning the importance of a case).
110. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 42 (setting out the obligation to provide fair
and equitable procedures for the enforcement of IP rights).
111. See id.
112. See id.
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subject to any contrary constitutional requirements.113 Article 43
TRIPS guarantees access to evidence in the hands of another party.
Taken together, Articles 41–43 TRIPS protect many internationally
recognized elements of the right to a fair trial and due process, and
ensure that a defendant can effectively participate in proceedings.114
As I have noted elsewhere,115 the specific elaborations in Articles
41–43 TRIPS do not fully reflect commonly accepted elements of a
fair trial.116 A procedure could be compliant with these specific rules
yet unfair by the international standards established in Article 14 of
the ICCPR.117 Article 14 states that fair trial in civil proceedings
requires equality before courts and tribunals for all persons whose
rights and obligations are to be determined.118 Equality before the
law has been articulated as requiring even-handed treatment of
parties:
The machinery of justice, the process by which rights are enforced, must
not . . . confer an advantage on one litigant at the expense of another

113. Compare id. with Sascha Vander, Section 1: General Obligations, in
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 707 (Peter-Tobias
Stroll, et al. eds., 2009) (explaining that mandating a prohibition against secrecy in
civil procedures has a constitutional basis in some South American countries and
in South East Asia).
114. Summers, supra note 69, at 742; see Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (highlighting how effective participation is a
fundamental element of procedural justice as conceived by modern scholars
working on legal systems and procedure).
115. Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges, supra note 16, at 192-93.
116. Note also that the relevant principles are applied, not just to court trials,
but to equivalent administrative processes: see e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 49,
50.8, 62.4; see Daniel J. Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS 461–62 (Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 3rd ed. 2008)
(showing how international IP instruments frequently include one or more
provisions that allow parties to use administrative rather than judicial procedures in
some or all circumstances, but which state that administrative proceedings must
meet the same standards of fairness etc. as judicial proceedings); see also TPP,
supra note 25, art. 18.31(a), 18.74.16 (including provisions of this kind; a number
of TPP provisions also refer to ‘competent authorities’ which would include
administrative, judicial or executive authorities but subject them to requirements of
fairness or transparency).
117. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118. See ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 14 (stating also that all persons shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law, and in the determination of criminal charges everyone shall be
awarded minimum guarantees).
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litigant, who has a claim to equal respect. It must not favor defendants
over plaintiffs, or vice versa, just as it must not favor the state over private
litigants.119

Article 14 also requires a hearing before a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal established by law.120 The better
view is that these elements of a fair trial, although not explicitly
stated in Article 42, are essential to providing procedures that meet
the standard set by Article 41.2.121 A Panel considering the scope of
fair and equitable procedures could be expected to take notice of the
ICCPR’s conception of the requirements of a fair trial.
In summary, the obligation to ensure that IP enforcement
procedures are fair and equitable is an important safeguard for the
rights of defendants and prospective defendants. It obliges Member
States to provide, within the context of their own legal system and
consistent with the importance of any case and the interests and
amount of money or other rights at stake, procedures that accord
even-handed treatment to parties to litigation. Additionally, it
requires mechanisms for ascertaining rights before competent,
independent, and impartial tribunals, as well as the basic factors of
fair trial: notice, legal representation, opportunities to make a case,
and answer evidence put by other parties.
Thus conceptualized, Articles 41–43 of TRIPS (and equivalents in
later instruments) provide a useful benchmark against which to judge
IP enforcement reforms. In recent times, a number of countries have
moved to allow for blocking of overseas websites:122 a right to
119. A.A.S Zuckerman, Interlocutory Remedies in Quest of Procedural
Fairness, 56 THE MODERN L. REV. 325, 325 (1993).
120. See ICCPR, supra note 70 (setting out this requirement. Note that this idea
is partially reflected in TRIPS art. 41.4 which requires review by a judicial
authority of final administrative decisions; and even if a tribunal failed to meet the
ICCPR standard, the judicial authority on appeal may comply).
121. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2 (requiring that procedures must be “fair
and equitable, and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail
unreasonable time-limits or delays”).
122. Court orders of this kind have become commonplace in the UK under §
97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1998 (UK). See Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981; Cartier
International v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 3354. In Europe, see
UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-314/12, March 27, 2014; in Australia,
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written notice and timely and sufficiently-detailed information
inclusive of relevant facts and the legal basis of any claim, ought to
limit the temptation to wholly automate such processes and deny
notice provided to targeted websites.123 Reforms that apply overly
strong presumptions regarding subsistence, validity, or infringement
of rights, or which place the burden of proof on the less resourced
party, could be seen as undue favoritism towards one party,
imperiling equality before courts and tribunals.124 The requirement of
a ‘competent, independent, and impartial tribunal’ could be breached
by some streamlined structures for online copyright enforcement, in
particular those using private forms of arbitration.125 Much would

see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) § 115A (providing for blocking of websites engaged
in flagrant infringement); see also Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore) s193DDA
(allowing for website blocking of websites engaged in flagrant infringement).
123. It should be noted that the TRIPS text in Articles 41–43 refers only to
defendants. In an (overseas) website blocking case, the ‘defendant’ is ordinarily an
internet service provider providing transmission services to customers: any
targeted website is a third party to the action. It is worth noting therefore that the
ICCPR (quoted immediately below) is more capacious in its language, and in fact
the legislative systems in both Singapore and Australia do require rights holders to
attempt to provide notice to affected websites. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) §
115A(4); Copyright Amendment Act 2014 (Singapore) 193DDB(1)(a).
124. The impact of presumptions on equality of treatment depends significantly
on the details of implementation: a presumption that can only be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence will have a far greater impact on a defendant than one
which requires they raise a prima facie case. Another example of procedures that
may increasingly be tilted towards right holders is provisions on seizure of
allegedly infringing goods at the border. See Weatherall, Provocations and
Challenges, supra note 11, at 192-93 (suggesting, that Australia, for example, has
revised its criminal provisions in copyright and trademark broadened the available
presumptions for proving subsistence and ownership of IP, tilting the balance
against defendants. Australia has also advantaged copyright owners by revising its
border measures to allow for the seizure and destruction of alleged infringing
goods without any formal court process).
125. See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes”
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4, 25, 54 (2013)
[hereinafter Bridy, Graduated Response] (suggesting that corporate copyright
owners have been trying to get ISPs to play a more active role in online copyright
enforcement where the ISPs promptly remove the content when they become
aware of it, and are situated to remove or disable access to it); see also Mary
LaFrance, Graduate Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 165, 166 (2012); see generally Nicolas Suzor & Brian
Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of Graduate Response Schemes in Copyright Law, 36
UNSW L.J. 1, 18 (2011) (highlighting how many copyright owners are enlisting
the assistance of Internet Service Providers (ISP’s), via processes in which the ISP
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depend on the particular rules and whether they preserve access to
the courts.126 It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which
policymakers might skirt the border between expertise and partiality
by appointing experts to tribunals who have a real or perceived
interest in the subject matter of enforcement.
Important as it is, the obligation to provide fair and equitable IP
enforcement procedures has not been included in all recent
international IP instruments dealing with enforcement. In particular,
it was not routinely included in the U.S. bilateral trade agreements
concluded in the first decade and a half of the 21st Century (like
AUSFTA), nor was it part of the early U.S. proposals for the IP
chapter of the TPP,127 although it was part of the final text.128 Further,
the specific elaborations in TRIPS as to factors included in fair and
equitable treatment are not repeated in the TPP (Art. 18.71.3), ACTA
(Art. 6.2), or the EU IP Enforcement Directive (Art. 3.1).129 The legal
takes action against users suspected of infringing copyright including issuing
warnings, reporting copyright owners, suspension and eventual termination of
service).
126. Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 125, at 18-19 (discussing a
decision of the French Constitutional Court ruling that a user’s internet access
could not be suspended solely on the authority of an administrative body without
court order. This argument could instead be reframed as breaching the requirement
for a competent, independent and impartial tribunal); see also Weatherall,
Provocations and Challenges, supra note 11, at 8 (suggesting that a key potential
limitation of the obligation to ensure fair and equitable enforcement procedures is
that it likely does not apply to procedures which are entirely private – such as
enforcement disciplines imposed by internet service providers as part of any
service contract); see also Suzor, supra note 125, at 33 (arguing for fair trial and
due process rights to private procedures).
127. There is no such provision, for example, in the leaked U.S. proposal for the
TPP IP chapter dated February 10, 2011. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual
Property Chapter Draft, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
[hereinafter TPP Draft] (lacking a similar provision).
128. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.3 (requiring procedures and remedies
that shall be fair and equitable, shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays).
129. More recent instruments do not enumerate all of these elements of a fair
and equitable system for enforcement. The TPP includes requirements for
decisions and reasons to be given in writing (TPP, art. 18.73.1(a)), but neither the
TPP nor ACTA makes any reference to the right to present or be heard on
evidence. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.73.1(a) (holding only that these
procedures shall not be unnecessarily complicated, costly or entail unreasonable
time limits or unwarranted delays).
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impact of such changes is discussed further below: in short, as I
argue below,130 omission of mandatory standards from TRIPS does
not change Parties’ obligation under international law to provide
these safeguards. Nevertheless, the absence of this rule and its
‘slimming down’ is potentially disturbing, if it is taken to suggest
that the specific protections in TRIPS are not important.

C. OTHER GENERAL PRINCIPLES: PROPORTIONALITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS

Other general principles stated in the various IP instruments
provide potential safeguards for defendant interests. One important
limit on both procedures and remedies is the requirement that they be
proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement. The threat of
grossly disproportionate damages is likely to chill creative and
inventive activity and other interactions with IP-protected material.131
Unfortunately, proportionality is addressed inconsistently and the
relevant treaty language is typically weak.
Although in most respects TRIPS provides the ‘gold standard’ in
defendant safeguards, the proportionality is one exception. The
TRIPS text contains no general requirement of proportionality.
However, it does include a number of specific references to the
concept in the provisions on destruction of infringing copies and
implements (Art. 46) and the right of information (Art. 47).132 In both
cases, TRIPS does not mandate proportionate responses or orders. In
relation to destruction of infringing copies, TRIPS requires that the
‘need for proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement
and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall
be taken into account.’133 In the case of the right of information,
130. See discussion, infra Part IV.A.
131. See Samuelson & Wheatland, Statutory Damages, supra note 35
(discussing the impacts of disproportionate statutory damages awards).
132. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 46 (requiring that courts considering requests
for orders for destruction of infringing goods, materials and implements consider
the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement and the
remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken into
account); see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (requiring that courts have the
power to order infringers to reveal the identity of third persons involved in
production and distribution of infringements, unless this would be disproportionate
to the infringement).
133. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 46.
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Article 47 states that:
Members may provide that the judicial authorities shall have the
authority, unless this would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the
infringement, to order the infringer to inform the right holder of the
identity of third persons involved in the production and distribution of the
infringing goods or services and of their channels of distribution. 134

Although the drafting of this provision is not clear, it suggests that
proportionality is something that courts should consider in deciding
whether to require the production of information from an infringer.135
The TPP, ACTA, and the EU IP Enforcement Directive all refer to
proportionality, although the language varies significantly. The EU
Directive is the most forceful: it requires that measures, procedures,
and remedies shall be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’136
This has been interpreted as requiring that measures adopted “do not
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to
obtain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in
question; where there is a choice between several appropriate
measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous.”137 The nature
134. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47.
135. The combination of an optional provision with a limitation based on
proportionality could be interpreted another way: namely as allowing for a right of
information but only in those cases where it would not be out of proportion to the
seriousness of the infringement. This reading, however, seems to be inconsistent
with subsequent developments in international IP instruments, which have
expanded the right of information while retaining proportionality as a
consideration, but not a limit, on the application of the procedure. EU Directive
2001/29, supra note 60, at art. 3; Compare ACTA, supra note 23, art. 11 (setting
out a right of information), with ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.3 (allowing for the
consideration of proportionality, but not as a mandatory limit on the availability of
procedures and remedies); see also TPP, supra note 25, arts. 18.74.13, 18.71.5
(requiring a right of information and requiring consideration (but not achievement)
of proportionality in granting remedies and penalties). The 2004 EU IP
Enforcement Directive is different: as noted, that directive mandates that
enforcement measures be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ (EU Directive
2004/48, supra note 22, Art. 3.1) and underlines this requirement of
proportionality in the art. 8 right of information by stating that Member States must
ensure that judicial authorities may order the production of information ‘in
response to a justified and proportionate request of the claimant’: art. 8.1.
136. EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60.
137. See generally Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd., [2014] EWHC
(Ch) 3354 (Eng.) (discussing proportionality in the context of website blocking
orders, relying on principles from EU case law outside the area of IP).
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and importance of other rights (such as rights to freedom of
expression) affected by a remedy and the cost and difficulty of
complying with orders are all relevant in assessing proportionality.138
In Europe, therefore, the requirement of proportionality provides a
specific avenue for considering the importance of other rights
(including human rights) affected by a given enforcement measure.139
By comparison, ACTA and the TPP contain a lesser obligation
that Parties implementing the provisions “take into account the need
for proportionality.”140 This suggests that a disproportionate remedy
or order could fail the standard set by the EU Directive but comply
with that in the TPP if proportionality was considered but prioritized
below other goals such as deterrence.141 It is also important to note
that the obligation in ACTA and the TPP is an obligation for parties
to the treaty to take proportionality into account in
implementation.142 Unlike the TRIPS requirements or the EU text,
138. See id. at ¶ 181 (holding that “limitations to rights may be made only if
they are necessary and meet the objectives of general interest recognized by the
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”); see also Golden
Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 723 (ruling that courts shall take
into account the applicable remedies, penalties, and interests of third parties).
139. See EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, Initial Provisions and General
Definitions (asserting that the obligations created by the directive co-exist with
their international agreements and existing rights and obligations).
140. See ACTA, supra note 23 (affirming that when determining
proportionality each party must consider the seriousness of the infringement, the
interests of third parties, the applicable measures, remedies and penalties); See also
Initial Provisions and General Definitions (providing various party-specific
definitions qualifying key terms).
141. Of course this is a moot point: no party bound by the EU Directive is or is
likely to be a party to the TPP which is a mega-regional agreement covering only
countries in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, the difference between the EU
Directive and the text of the TPP may reflect a difference between the United
States and EU which could be interesting to watch in the context of the TTIP
negotiations. Compare TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71 (adopting only that each
party shall take the need for proportionality into consideration and that these
procedures shall be applied in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade), with EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, recital 22 (holding
that it is “essential that provisional measures for the immediate termination of
infringements without awaiting a decision on the substance of a case, while
observing the rights of the defence, ensuring the proportionality of the provisional
measures” be provided).
142. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71 (mandating that in implementing the
provisions of the TPP each Party shall take into account the need for
proportionality); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.3 (drafted in almost identical
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individual courts in particular cases are not required to take
proportionality into account.143 It is also noteworthy that the scope
contemplated for a principle of proportionality varies from treaty to
treaty. The ACTA applies this requirement to ‘measures, remedies
and penalties.’144 By contrast the TPP only applies a requirement of
proportionality to ‘applicable remedies and penalties.’145 Both ACTA
and TPP require consideration of the need for proportionality
between these measures or remedies, the seriousness of the
infringement, and the interests of third parties.146 ACTA further
articulates an additional general requirement that procedures
‘provide for the rights of all participants subject to such procedures
to be appropriately protected’ (without elaborating further on which
‘rights’ might be relevant, although the ICCPR’s right to a fair trial is
an obvious candidate, as are the various rights to notice, etc., set out
in TRIPS Articles 41–43).147
Even aside from the relative weakness of this language on
proportionality contained in international IP instruments,
proportionality has inherent limits as a constraint on enforcement
procedures which have been well-explained by legal theorists. For
example, recent work of legal philosopher Nicola Lacey148 points out
that proportionality is not a naturally existing relationship between,
say, a wrong and a punishment.149 Nor, according to empirical
studies cited by Lacy, is there a general consensus about what

language).
143. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 46, 47 (addressing, in each case, the
requirement of proportionality to powers exercised by judicial authorities); see also
EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, art. 10.3 (requiring that courts consider the
need for proportionality when considering a request for corrective measures).
144. See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 1.
145. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.
146. TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.5; see ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.3.
147. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41 (establishing procedures that ensure
enforcement will not be complicated or costly, written decisions, and an
opportunity for judicial review).
148. See Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, The Chimera of Proportionality:
Institutionalizing Limits on Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political
Systems, 78 MOD. L. REV. 216 (2015); see also Nicola Lacey, The Metaphor of
Proportionality, 43 J.L. SOC’Y 27, 38 (2016).
149. See Lacey, supra note 162, at 38 (arguing that proportionality is a product of
social and political considerations, cultural components and institution building).
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constitutes a ‘proportionate’ punishment or remedy.150 While there
may be a fair degree of consensus regarding the relative seriousness
of ‘standard’ criminal offenses, there is far less consensus regarding
what this implies in terms of what penalty is suitable. There may be
no agreement on the relative seriousness of regulatory offenses,
which would include IP offenses. Following the logic of the WTO
Panel decision in the US-China dispute,151 what constitutes
proportionate punishment is highly likely to be determined by
reference to the broader legal system and societal context within a
given country. It would be legitimate for significant differences in
remedies and penalties to exist from country to country for all kinds
of reasons. Indeed, this principle is commonly reflected in
international IP text relating to criminal penalties, such as Article 61
TRIPS, which requires that:
Remedies available [for criminal IP offenses] shall include imprisonment
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. 152

Given Lacey’s work, it is far from clear how to interpret the last
phrase of this provision; exactly what kinds of offenses would be of
‘corresponding gravity?’153 Even acknowledging all these limitations,
recognizing proportionality as a consideration is better than having
no such consideration to counter the requirement that measures be
‘deterrent.’154 Such a requirement at least provides space to consider
150. See id., at 40 (suggesting a difference between ordinal proportionality in
which there is a noteworthy degree of consensus and cardinal proportionality,
which reveals no consensus regarding suitable penalties).
151. See generally US-China Panel Report, supra note 75 at ¶ 7.514..
152. Accord TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.77.6(a). The EU IP Enforcement
Directive does not address criminal enforcement; the EU did not, at the time the
Directive was drafted, have jurisdiction to address matters of national criminal law;
see ACTA, supra note 23, art. 24 (establishing that it is understood that there is no
obligation for a party to provide for the possibility of imprisonment and monetary
fines to be imposed in parallel); see also EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60,
recital 28 (stating only that “criminal sanctions also constitute, in appropriate
cases, a means of ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights”).
153. It may be that, consistent with the reasoning in US–China, the
determination of what kinds of offenses are of ‘corresponding gravity’ is a matter
for a particular State to determine. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.
154. Modern IP treaties often put effectiveness and deterrence at the forefront
of the enforcement calculus. Compare TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1, with ACTA,
supra note 23, art. 6.1, and TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.1, with EU Directive
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whether a damage award in six figures awarded against an individual
engaged in file-sharing, while undoubtedly a ‘deterrent,’ is
appropriate.155 Where deterrence rules over proportionality, there is
considerable risk of creating both scapegoats and significant chilling
effects.
TRIPS and other instruments also require that enforcement
measures must be effective. The EU IP Enforcement Directive
requires that “measures, procedures and remedies shall . . . be
effective.”156 TRIPS, ACTA, and the TPP all oblige parties to:
ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement . . . .157

This requirement has the capacity to limit the availability of
measures because it may rule out measures, such as remedies, which
would be futile. We are perhaps accustomed to thinking about
‘effectiveness’ as requiring implementation of IP owner rights almost
at all costs on the basis that a requirement to provide ‘effective’
enforcement measures means that the measures provided must work
and reduce infringement. But decisions from the UK suggest that
measures such as website blocking are less likely to be considered
effective or proportionate if there are a large number of alternative
websites that are equally accessible and appealing.158
A final general safeguard is the protection of privacy and
2001/29, supra note 60 (establishing similar but slightly different language;
requiring that ‘measures, procedures and remedies shall. . .be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive’). This latter trifecta is particularly telling: where the
obligation is that measures be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, the concept
of proportionality stands out as the factor most likely to provide safeguards for
defendant users.
155. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 899 (8th
Cir. 2012) (suggesting damages equivalent to USD $222,000 for 24 songs made
available on peer-to-peer networks).
156. EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, art. 3.2.
157. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; TPP, supra
note 25, art. 18.71.1.
158. See Cartier Int’l AG, EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶¶ 175-176 (holding that UK
courts have the power to grant injunctions against an ISP if it has “actual
knowledge” that an operator was using its service to infringe copyright, but noting
also the relevance of how readily available other means of infringement are).

(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANT RIGHTS

249

confidentiality. Privacy and confidentiality are particularly important
in the context of enforcement procedures for securing evidence
(which may involve the seizure or provision of private, or
commercially sensitive, information). They are also important to the
‘right of information’ – that is, the power granted in a number of
international IP instruments for courts to order (or authorities to
provide) information in the hands of an infringer, alleged infringer,
or third party that may identify other infringers of IP for the purposes
of bringing proceedings.159 TRIPS makes a number of references to
confidentiality.160 Article 42 requires that IP enforcement procedures
‘provide a means to identify and protect confidential information’;161
and Article 43, which relates to the production of reasonably
available evidence, is subject to ‘conditions which ensure the
protection of confidential information.’162 The protection of
confidential information is also referenced in Article 57, which
provides for inspection of goods detained at the border.163 ACTA and
the TPP also both make numerous references to confidentiality. 164
However, it is important to note that most of these provisions allow
for the application of a State’s laws regarding privacy or
confidentiality, rather than imposing an independent international
obligation to protect confidentiality or privacy.165 Such provisions,
159. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (detailing the right of information).
160. See generally id. art. 42-43, 57 (including confidentiality references under
the fair and equitable procedures, evidence, and right of inspection and information
articles).
161. Id. art. 42 (indicating the procedures are to be followed unless this would
be contrary to existing constitutional requirements).
162. Id. art. 43 (indicating that judicial authorities have the authority to order
the evidence be subject to such conditions of confidentiality).
163. See id. art. 57 (providing for border seizure of alleged infringing items in
certain circumstances).
164. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18 (referencing Article 18.74.13 on the
qualification on the right of information, Article 18.74.14 on the power to sanction
parties, counsel and experts for breach of rules concerning protection of
confidential information, and Article 18.76.4 on the qualification on provisions of
information about goods suspended at the border); see also ACTA, supra note 23,
art. 4, 11, 22 (referencing in Article 4 the general qualifications of privacy and
disclosure of information, and in Article 11 the qualification on the right of
information related to infringement, and in Article 22 the disclosure of information
related to shipments of goods).
165. See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 4 (making the various obligations in ACTA
subject to considerations of privacy and confidentiality, but qualifying those
considerations by reference to domestic legal principles).
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therefore, empower States to act to secure privacy interests and
confidential information if they so choose, or, for States recognizing
a constitutional right to privacy, ensure consistency between their
Constitution and international IP obligations.

D. OTHER SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANTS
This Part has so far focused on potential sources of safeguards for
defendant rights and interests that are framed at the level of general
principle. These are important sources of protection for defendants,
in part because principles are dynamic and have the capacity to
adjust with and respond to changes in technology or the strategies of
IP owners. However, it is important to be aware of very specific rules
that are contained especially in TRIPS, and which oblige states to
protect, or provide the capacity to protect, specific defendant
interests during IP enforcement proceedings.
A number of provisions provide for rights of review:166 a right to
review final administrative decisions (Art. 41.4); a right to review of
any suspension of (alleged infringing) goods by customs even if
proceedings on the merits are commenced (in order to determine
whether the suspension should be modified, revoked or confirmed)
(Art. 55); and rights to the review of any provisional measures
adopted inaudita altera parte (Art. 50.4).167 Other TRIPS provisions
require expiry of provisional measures in the absence of an action on
the merits: border measures expire if no proceedings are commenced
within ten working days (extendable once) (Art. 55); TRIPS also
requires that provisional measures be revoked on request if
proceedings are not commenced within twenty working days (Art.
50.6).168
Finally, a number of provisions provide for compensation for a

166. Unsurprisingly, rights of review are not confined to protecting defendants:
TRIPS contains a number of rights of review for the benefit of IP owners and
applicants: See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(g), 32, 62.5 (suggesting that the
competent authorities such as judicial officers have the right of review. This power
is not confined to protecting defendants as it is for the benefit of IP owners and
applicants).
167. See id. art. 41.4, 50.4, 55; see generally EU Directive 2004/48, supra note
22, art. 7.1, 9.4 (similarly providing for rights to review such as orders for
preservation of evidence and provisional and precautionary measures).
168. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.6, 55.
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defendant for costs or harms incurred as a result of enforcement
action. TRIPS requires that if provisional or border measures lapse or
are revoked, or if no infringement or threat of infringement is found,
courts will have the authority to order appropriate compensation for
any injury suffered.169 The EU IP Enforcement Directive (Art. 7.4)
and ACTA (Art. 12.5) both include a similar provision.170 Relatedly,
TRIPS Articles 50 (provisional measures) and 53 (border measures)
both require that when applying these procedures, competent
authorities must have the power to order the applicant to provide a
security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant
and to prevent abuse.171
The importance of these specific safeguards lies in what they
contribute to the protection of defendant rights and interests through
their precision and clarity. While the principles discussed earlier in
this paper are important for their ability to evolve and address new
situations, these protections are clear and easy to implement. This is
why it is once again disturbing to see how many have disappeared
from certain recent international instruments dealing with IP
enforcement: although the legal effect of their non-inclusion may be
limited (as discussed further below), there is an element of ‘out of

169. See TRIPS supra note 6, art. 50.7 (providing for compensation in relation
to provisional measures); TRIPS supra note 6, art. 56 (providing for the
indemnification of the importer and of the owner of the goods wrongly seized at
the border).
170. Regulation No. 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003, O.J. (L. 181) 15, 15
[hereinafter EU Regulation]. Within the EU, IP border measures are dealt with via
a separate regulation which provides for compensation for harm in Article 28; see
ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12.5 (providing for provisional measures and although
ACTA contains no specific obligation regarding compensation, Article 18 does
allow the competent authorities to require security sufficient to ‘protect the
defendant’); see also EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 7.4 (setting out
measures to preserve evidence and compensation); see generally TPP, supra note
25, art. 18.74.15 (failing to provide for compensation akin to that available in the
EU, but providing for judicial authorities to have authority to order compensation
where a party requesting measures has abused enforcement procedures).
171. Daniel Gervais, supra note 116, at 470 (describing that a security or such
an assurance may be in the form of a credit or bank reference or local guarantor);
see TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 50, 53; see also TPP, supra note 25, arts. 18.75.2,
18.76.3 (setting out provisional measures and special requirements relating to
border measures).
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sight, out of mind,’ and it is important that these rules not be ignored
when reforming IP enforcement procedures. It is arguable that some
attempts to make enforcement measures more ‘efficient’ and
‘effective,’ such as moves to allow for automated forfeiture of goods
seized by customs, contravene the spirit if not the text of the TRIPS
rules on border measures.172

E. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE OF IP RIGHTS
A final source of power for states to limit IP enforcement
procedures and remedies lies in a set of Articles addressing abuse of
rights, found in both general and specific forms in various
international IP instruments.173 The most complete set of provisions
is found in TRIPS, which incorporates three general provisions
relating to the prevention of abuse IP rights (Art. 8), of market power
(Art. 8.2 & 40), and of enforcement procedures (chiefly Art. 41).174
172. See Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges, supra note 11, at 195-96;
see also Thomas Jaeger et al., Statement of the Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the Review of EU Legislation
on Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION & TAX LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO.
10-08 (2010) (elaborating on international enforcement measures of intellectual
property rights). ‘Automated forfeiture’ approaches are used in both the EU
(Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of Intellectual property rights and
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, OJ L 181/15 (29.6.2013) and in
Australia. An importer whose goods are seized is required actively to object to
seizure and claim the goods, or they are deemed to have consented to forfeiture.
This is very different from the TRIPS model, which assumes that right holders
must act within a given period to commence proceedings on the merits.
173. See Gervais, supra note 116, at 2.404 (discussing the TRIPS agreement
provisions on abuse); see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.3.2 (including language
very similar to that in TRIPS, recognizing that appropriate measures “may be
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders”); see
generally ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1 (Requiring that IP enforcement
procedures be applied ‘in such a manner as to . . . provide for safeguards against
their abuse’). Notably it is not unusual for the US bilateral FTAs to eschew general
safeguards against abuse of IP rights, which raises some interesting questions of
interpretation.
174. TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 8, 40, 41. These are not the only provisions that
mention abuse: less relevant to individual enforcement proceedings are art. 63
(transparency), which requires the publication of laws, regulations, court decisions
and administrative rulings pertaining to (inter alia) the prevention of the abuse of
IP rights; and art. 67 (technical cooperation), which requires that developed
countries provide developing and least-developed countries with assistance in the
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Consideration of Article 40 (abuse of market power) raises
competition law/antitrust issues and is beyond the scope of this
paper,175 but abuse of rights, and abuse of process, both warrant more
detailed discussion because both can be the basis for potential
safeguards for defendants and broader public interests in IP
enforcement cases.
1. Preventing abuse of IP rights
TRIPS Art. 8.2 recognizes that:
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.176

Article 8 does not create an obligation to take action to prevent the
abuse of IP rights, but it does empower States to take action and
provides a basis for interpreting other TRIPS provisions, including
the (flexibly drafted) enforcement provisions.177 Similar to the
concept of a fair trial, ‘abuse’ of IP rights is a dynamic concept

preparation of laws and regulations dealing with (inter alia) the prevention of the
abuse of IP rights.
175. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 40 (elaborating on the control of anticompetitive practices in contractual licenses).
176. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8.2; see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.3.2
(setting forth identical text as in the TRIPS agreement).
177. CARLOS MARIA CORREA, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 108–12 (2007)
(noting that Article 8.2 is also important for the discussion of transfer of
technology in the context of the TRIPS Agreement); Gervais, supra note 116, at
2.85 (suggesting that the limitation “consistent with the provisions of this
agreement” in this article is likely to confine the article to an “interpretive
function” rather than a direct obligation); see TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8
(discussing general principles for adopting appropriate measures); see generally
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States,
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights—The
Relationship Between the Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and Access to
Medicines, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/280 (June 22, 2001) [hereinafter Communication
from the European Communities and their Member States] (noting that “although
Articles 7 and 8 were not drafted as general exception clauses, they are important
for interpreting other provisions of the Agreement, including where measures are
taken by Members to meet health objectives”).
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capable of evolving to meet the creative antics of IP owners;
therefore, it is neither necessary nor possible to provide an
exhaustive definition. However, we can explore the potential of this
concept. The question of interest is whether the general principle
which allows State action against abuse of rights allows for some
limits on IP enforcement procedures or remedies which may, by
protecting the rights or interests of a defendant, promote broader
public interests (and user rights) in IP. Abuse of rights may not
immediately spring to mind as providing a means of safeguarding
defendant and broader public interests. In fact, however, there is a
long international and national history of limiting a plaintiff’s access
to remedies for abuse of rights.
At the national level, the longstanding Roman and civilian law
concept of abuse of right (abus de droit)178 can operate as a defense
to an action or a basis for refusing at least some remedies in an IP
action. Abuse of right as applied in different jurisdictions varies
significantly, and a detailed consideration is beyond the scope of this
paper.179 Broadly, abuse of right refers to situations in which a right
178. E.g. Christophe Geiger, THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, OR HOW ETHICS CAN INFLUENCE THE SHAPE AND USE OF IP
LAW IN METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 171–74
(Graeme Dinwoodie ed. 2013) (discussing the potential of abuse of right or
analogous doctrines in domestic proceedings); see Mark Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111,
151-58 (1999) (elaborating on the potential of copyright misuse in domestic
proceedings); see also Alison Slade, Good Faith and the TRIPS Agreement:
Putting Flesh on the bones of TRIPS “Objectives”, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 353
(2014) (discussing abuse of right as it is relevant to assessing state decisions
regarding implementation of TRIPS and considering whether a State could abuse
its rights in relation to treatment of IP). With the exception of Slade, these
discussions are targeted at the level of domestic law: that is, they discuss the
potential of abuse of right or analogous doctrines in domestic proceedings. Slade
discusses abuse of right as it is relevant to assessing State decisions regarding
implementation of TRIPS: that is, she considers whether a State could abuse its
rights in relation to treatment of IP. The present discussion departs from this
literature, in that it is concerned with ways that a State might justify certain
implementations or adjustments to IP rights or, in particular, remedies within the
text of TRIPS, in order to address alleged abuse of right by right holders.
179. See Annekatrien Lenaerts, The General Principle of the Prohibition of
Abuse of Rights: A Critical Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract
Law, 18 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1121, 1122 (2010) (explaining abuse of right analysis
within the European contract law system); see generally Michael Byers, Abuse of
Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389, 391 (2002) (examining
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is formally exercised in conformity with the conditions laid down in
the rule granting the right, but where the legal outcome is against the
objective of that rule. In other words, there is a ‘tension between the
strict application of a rule and the true spirit of that rule.’180 U.S. law
also recognizes the doctrine of copyright misuse, which is said to
arise where a copyright owner seeks to leverage their limited
monopoly to allow them to control areas outside the monopoly.181
Such use is inconsistent with the purpose and ‘spirit’ of copyright. A
finding of copyright misuse in the United States renders the
copyright unenforceable but not void.182 U.S. courts have also
recognized a doctrine of patent misuse, which is applied mostly
where patents are used to violate antitrust law183 and similarly
renders a patent unenforceable.184
At the international level, one kind of right holder conduct, which
has historically been viewed as an abuse of IP rights by a sizeable
proportion of countries, is failure to work a granted patent,
sometimes referred to as non-working of the patent. A patent is
‘worked’ when it is exploited, although it can be exploited in two
different ways. The absence of working at all, i.e. the failure to
exploit the patent through either local manufacture of the invention
or importation of products embodying the invention, is perhaps the
obvious case where a patent might be ‘abused’. In such a case, use of
the right to exclude is in tension with the overall objectives of IP,
the origins, historical applications, and contemporary limitations of abuse of rights
and demonstrating how the principle remains relevant).
180. Lenaerts, supra note 179, at 1122; see Pierre Catala & John Antony Weir,
Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, Part II, 38 TUL. L. REV. 221, 237–38 (1964)
(noting that in cases where rights are framed in relatively general and generous
terms commentators declare that it is particularly appropriate and may be
particularly necessary).
181. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-79 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that the misuse of copyright defense is a valid defense); see also
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1087 (2006) (analyzing
United States courts and copyright misuse); see generally Alcatel USA, Inc. v.
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing the copyright
misuse defense).
182. Lemley, supra note 178, at 151.
183. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 386 (1945); see
also Lemley, supra note 178, at 152-53 (discussing the difference between
copyright and patent misuse such that patent misuse is largely co-extensive with
antitrust analysis and copyright misuse is not).
184. Hartford-Empire Co., at 386.
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which include access to technology.185 But a failure to work locally
(local non-working) – ie where the patent holder has exploited their
exclusivity only through importation of the patented goods, and not
through local manufacture – has also been conceived of as an abuse
of right. For many developing countries, part of the quid pro quo of
the patent system is that the grant of rights facilitates disclosure and
encourages diffusion of technical information in a way that supports
innovation including local innovation.186 This aspect of the quid pro
quo of IP is reflected in TRIPS, specifically in Article 7’s references
to transfer and dissemination of technology.187 Arguably, it is
impossible for a developing country to ‘upskill’ the local population
and, hence, create the foundation for future local innovation, without
local practicing (through manufacture) of patented technology.188
Non-working as described in the previous paragraph is specifically
recognized as a potential abuse of patent rights and a legitimate basis
for carefully circumscribed State action in Article 5(a) of the Paris
Convention.189 During the TRIPS negotiations, developing nations
proposed wording suggesting that rights holders owed positive
185. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7 (elaborating on the objectives of the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights).
186. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 66 (requiring developed country members to
“provide incentives . . . or the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology
transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a
sound and viable technological base”).
187. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7 (declaring that one of the objectives of the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology).
188. See GRAEME DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST
VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 43–44 (2012); see generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, ¶
5.46 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of local working for technology
transfer). This argument would be stronger when mounted by countries needing to
increase local scientific and innovative capacity: countries with advanced local
research and innovation scenes and infrastructure does not have equivalent need to
ensure local working in order to promote local innovative capacity.
189. Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 5(a); see Dinwoodie, supra note 188,
at 43-45 (illustrating an example between the United States and Brazil to enforce
local working requirements); see generally Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent
Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the
U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (2002) (exploring the
non-working phenomenon in the United States and Brazil patent dispute).
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obligations to the State granting an IP right, such as actually utilizing
granted patents. This language was ultimately not adopted in
TRIPS,190 raising a question whether the Paris Convention’s
conceptualization of non-working as abuse will survive.191 This was
almost put to the test in the early days of TRIPS when the United
States commenced dispute settlement procedures after Brazil
awarded a compulsory license to a local manufacturer in order to
ensure an adequate, affordable, reliable, and local supply of AIDS
drugs. Brazil was relying on Article 31 and the provision in Article 8
allowing members to take measures to protect public health.192 The
parties reached a mutually agreeable solution which left the question
of the legality of non-working requirements open.193 However,
scholars have mounted a convincing argument based on a range of
TRIPS articles that local working requirements are consistent with
TRIPS.194 This suggests that States could enact a TRIPS-compliant
system allowing defendants in infringement actions to counterclaim
demanding some form of compulsory license in appropriate

190. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 2.1 (noting that TRIPS Article 2.1 requires
that Members of TRIPS “comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the
Paris Convention”); see generally Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the
Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 325 (2010)
(elaborating on how the pharmaceutical industry lobbied for, but did not obtain, a
prohibition on local working requirements).
191. See Mercurio, supra note 190, at 286 (stating that a key question was
whether local working requirements violate TRIPS Article 27, which requires that
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported
or locally produced”).
192. See Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures
Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1
(July 19, 2001) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the United States]
(setting out the request by the United States to consult with Brazil over local
working requirements).
193. See Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil–Measures
Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1
(July 19, 2001) [hereinafter Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution] (relaying
the communications between Brazil and the United States that an agreed solution
has been reached in the patent dispute over local working requirements).
194. See Dinwoodie, supra note 188, at 43-45 (arguing that the language
suggests that countries can require local working); see also Mercurio, supra note
190, at 275-76 (arguing that working requirements are consistent with the TRIPS
agreement).
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circumstances of non-working.195
What about decisions not to supply or to delay supply of copyright
content as opposed to patented inventions? It is much harder to argue
that a failure to supply copyright content is an abuse of IP rights.
First, because unlike in the case of non-working for a patent, there is
no treaty text recognizing ‘non-working’ of copyright as an abuse.196
Second, because a societal quid pro quo is less central to copyright
law: natural rights-based reasoning, which emphasizes the right of
authors to control their authored works, and downgrades the
theoretical role of the public interest in access to content and societal
benefit, is stronger in copyright than in patent. Further, where the
interaction between patent law and development is clear and
reflected in Article 7 TRIPS, copyright’s development role is less
clearly articulated in most international instruments. However, there
is domestic precedent in the form of the U.S. copyright misuse
doctrine; some international law scholars mention high royalties as a
potential abuse of IP rights.197 Further, Article 8 is concerned
generally with practices which ‘unreasonably restrain trade or
adversely affect the international transfer of technology,’ which
could be an effect of denying access to copyrighted content.198
Internationally there is also some history of developing countries
arguing that copyright, like patent, involves a quid pro quo so that a
State ought to be entitled to take action if effective access is denied,
especially in the context of developing countries’ demand for
mechanisms to allow translations of copyright content, as well as
access for the purposes of educating their populations.199
195. Dinwoodie, supra note 188, at 43-45.
196. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, U.S. Manufacturing Clause,
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents at 74 (31st Supp. 1985) [hereinafter
GATT] (holding that the US’ extension of the local manufacturing clause violated
the US’ obligations under the GATT, despite a long (US) history of requiring local
manufacturing (printing) as a precondition of full copyright protection. Requiring
local printing however is quite different to requiring local supply of copyright
content).
197. See Correa, supra note 177, at 105 (indicating that the regulation of royalty
rates is one measure that can be taken to promote the public interest).
198. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8.
199. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND Vol. II, Ch. 14
(2006) (outlining the Berne Appendix, which allows developing nations certain
narrow (and cumbersome) flexibilities over translation and reproduction of printed
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Further, recent international instruments also suggest an emerging
view that copyright, too, has a role in promoting development, and
that a legitimate objective of copyright is access to created works.
The best multilateral demonstration of this growing consensus is
found in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published
Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise
Print Disabled, which explicitly recognizes in its Preamble ‘the need
to maintain a balance between the effective protection of the rights of
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research, and access to information, and that such balance must
facilitate effective and timely access to works for the benefit of
persons with visual impairments or with other print disabilities.’200
TPP Article 18.4 (‘Understandings in Respect of this Chapter’) also
recognizes the need to facilitate the diffusion of information,
knowledge, technology, culture and the arts through IP systems, and
to take into account ‘the interests of relevant stakeholders, including
right holders, service providers, users and the public’ (emphasis
added).201 Taken together, these various points may justify a State’s
view that at least some copyright owner’s decisions that have the
effect of denying access to copyright material constitute an abuse of
rights justifying mitigating measures by the State.
What about situations where access to copyright content is delayed

works); see Lionel Bently, Copyright, Translations, and Relations between Britain
and India in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries 82(3) CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1181, 1182 (2007) (examining the historical background of the copyright
relations between Britain and India in terms of the 1914 Act, in particular around
rights of translation, as an example of an early attempt to accommodate a claim to
local difference in a regime of both international and imperial standards. India’s
conduct in positively allowing translations is an example of the longstanding
demand for translation rights by certain developing countries).
200. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The (Non) Use of Treaty Object and Purpose
in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 11-15, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 1992-2012 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012).
201. TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.4; see generally Kimberlee Weatherall, Section
by Section Commentary on the TPP Final IP Chapter Published 5 November
2015—Part 1—General Provisions, Trade mark, GIs, Designs (2015),
http://works.bepress.com/kimweatherall/31/ (elaborating on the TPP final IP
chapter and discussing that this is one area where it is arguable that some of the
language of the TPP is more progressive and modern than TRIPS).
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or unreasonably priced?202 In recent times, Australia has had an
active debate over the delays its residents experienced in gaining
access to movies and television shows.203 However, States are not
entitled to sit in judgment over every pricing or marketing decision
of copyright owners, even where inconvenient.204 Price and access
decisions are of the essence of copyright as conceived as an
exclusive right: at its heart, copyright depends on facilitating markets
for copyrighted works. IP owners argue strongly that they are
entitled to make decisions about price, and the date they will enter a
market, with the overall purpose of maximizing profits. It would be
inappropriate to describe situations where copyright content is
delayed in the short term as ‘abuse’: a creator planning to exploit
their material ought, in general, to be the first one to release material
publicly and gain the benefits of well-timed, well-promoted first
release. Further, not every price differential between countries is
unjustified: it is not illegitimate that copyright content is more
expensive in Australia, with its high annual average income, as
compared to Vietnam; costs of marketing copyright content may well
vary from country to country.205
The concept of abuse of right is aimed at conduct that injuriously

202. See generally Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 5(a) (noting that as the
discussion shades from denial of access to IP-protected products into denial of
reasonable or timely access to IP-protected products, it is worth remembering that
Article 5A of the Paris Convention refers to the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to
work: thus clearly contemplating the concept of abuse extends to situations beyond
non-working).
203. See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and
Communications, Parliament of Australia, At What Cost? IT Pricing and the
Australia Tax 92 (2013) (Austl.) [hereinafter Australia Tax] (examining alleged
price and access differences suffered by Australians in gaining access to content,
when compared against populations in other countries at similar levels of
development).
204. See Weatherall, supra note 201, at 1 (elaborating that there are many
shades of grey at the level of copyright principle elsewhere).
205. See Australia Tax, supra note 203, at vii (noting that the Australian
Parliamentary Committee found that copyright owners did not, and likely could
not, justify at least some of the price premiums which the Committee labelled “the
Australia tax”); see generally JOE KARAGANIS, RETHINKING PIRACY IN MEDIA
PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, 56-63 (2011) (suggesting some methods that
could be used to determine whether pricing is reasonable as well as evidence that
in some cases in developing countries pricing is entirely unreasonable).
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affects the interests of the community, or where the exercise of the
right is inconsistent with the objectives of that right. It is appropriate
to egregious, not everyday cases. A delay in seeing the latest
Hollywood or HBO blockbuster is a #firstworldproblem. But
evidence before an Australian Parliamentary Committee suggested
there are more serious problems that can arise even for a developed
country in relation to access to copyright material.206 The Committee
found, for example, that business-essential software was priced
significantly (and unjustifiably) higher in Australia than in the
United States, creating an impediment to Australian small and
medium enterprises’ ability to compete on a level playing field – an
issue that could be seen as a quintessential trade issue.207 By analogy,
if a country finds that copyright content, essential to the development
of local capacity (for example, scientific journals or basic texts), was
priced out of reach of, say, 90% of its population, then perhaps this
might justify a conclusion that rights were being abused.
Even a strong argument that certain practices constitute abuse does
not, under TRIPS (or the TPP), give rise to a right in the State to take
action contrary to other provisions of the agreement; recall that
TRIPS Articles 8 and 18.3.2 are interpretive principles.208 However,
the open-ended drafting of the enforcement provisions provides
avenues for acting on abuse.209 That is, understanding certain
practices of IP owners as abuse may assist a state to conceptualize

206. See generally Australia Tax, supra note 203.
207. See id. 24-26 (outlining cost differentials for professional software), 26-27
(similar evidence regarding other specialist software).
208. See Gervais, supra note 116, at 2.404.
209. See Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss supra note 188, 72-78 (discussing the US
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In
eBay, the Supreme Court discussed the principles on which an injunction against
patent infringement might be withheld, putting a greater burden on patent holders
to establish irreparable injury and allowing for consideration whether the grant of
an injunction would disserve the public interest: ibid at 391. Dinwoodie &
Dreyfuss consider whether eBay is consistent with article 44 of TRIPS, and in
defending it, fall back on some quite general arguments about state discretion in
TRIPS’ enforcement provisions, and the difficulties for any challenger posed by
the burden of proof established in the WTO in US-China Panel Report, supra note
75). Although noting that one possible defence for the eBay decision is that it
creates a compulsory licence to correct an abuse of IP rights, they do not appear to
consider whether characterising IP owner activity as ‘abuse’ could be used to
support an approach to implementing article 44 of TRIPS, as contemplated here.
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and defend principles designed to tailor remedies for IP infringement
in a way that is sensitive to the overall objectives of IP rights. For
example, a State might legislate to require courts to consider the
absence or degree of public access to copyright content in
determining remedies. The Copyright Principles Project led by
intellectual property professor Pamela Samuelson suggested that
availability should be relevant to court decisions to grant or refuse
injunctions,210 but such factors could also be relevant to the award of
damages.211 Recent IP instruments often require that courts assessing
damages for IP infringement have the authority to consider ‘any
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may
include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services
measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.’212 There
is nothing, however, in the text concerning damages that prevents a
State from adding other relevant considerations, such as accessibility
of IP-protected content, in terms both of whether it is available at all,
and whether it is affordable. Similar considerations could also be
relevant to prosecutors’ decisions whether to commence criminal
proceedings: public authorities might wish to prioritize the spending
of public enforcement resources on copyright material made widely
available to the public, or even refuse to spend public resources
where materials are not available, or negotiate for better public
access as a precondition of devoting public resources to
enforcement.213
210. See Pamela Samuelson et al, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions
for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1223–26 (2010) (recommending that
courts should have discretion to issue injunctions in copyright infringement cases.
The Copyright Principles project was designed to bring together experts with a
range of views and perspectives to consider whether ‘common ground’ on certain
amendments to copyright law could be reached).
211. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 45.1 (setting out the power judicial authorities
have in awarding damages); ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1 (establishing principles
for damages and the enforcement through civil judicial proceedings); EU Directive
2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13 (establishing principles relating to damages and the
power judicial authorities have to order them); see, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, arts.
18.74.3-18.74.4 (bearing considerable resemblance to the provisions referenced
here).
212. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.4 (setting out measures of damages
judicial authorities may utilize); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1 (bearing
considerable resemblance to the provisions referenced here).
213. See Kimberlee Weatherall, A Reimagined Approach to Enforcement from a
Regulator’s Perspective in What if we could reimagine copyright? (Rebecca Giblin

(DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANT RIGHTS

263

Similar to other safeguards discussed in this paper, principles
regarding States’ rights to take action against abuse of rights have
been under pressure and are at some risk of disappearing. Gervais
has traced the dilution of language on abuse in TRIPS, and a review
of the iterations of the IP chapter of the TPP show a similar process.
While the TRIPS provisions have been repeated in the TPP, the
United States and Japan resisted proposals supported by all other
parties to the negotiation that would have inserted stronger language
supporting States’ rights to address abuse of rights.214 IP chapters in
U.S. bilateral trade agreements in the period 2000–2010 tended not
to include general safeguards against abuse akin to those found in
TRIPS Article 8 at all.
Preventing abuse of enforcement procedures.
A second kind of abuse recognized in TRIPS is abuse of process,
specifically in Article 41.1:
1.Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this
Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against

& Kimberlee Weatherall eds., forthcoming 2016) (arguing that this latter idea is
consistent with TRIPS. Governments have discretion as to the direction of public
enforcement resources, including prosecutor time, and most international
instruments are quite explicit in affirming that international instruments do not
create obligations to direct public law enforcement resources in any particular way:
see TPP art 18.71.4 (stating that the IP chapter does ‘not create any obligation . . .
with respect to the distribution as between the enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the enforcement of law in general’, nor does it ‘affect the capacity of
each Party to enforce law in general’). There is no specific principle in the TPP
requiring non-discrimination in the application of public law enforcement
resources. Similar provisions may be found in TRIPS art. 41.5 and ACTA art. 2.2.
Nevertheless, we could expect that a State that prioritises certain kinds of
copyright content over others in its prosecution decisions would be criticised, and
part of the purpose here is to articulate the kinds of arguments that can be used to
justify such decisions.) See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 289-91 (giving an
alternate perspective on whether one emerging problem with TRIPS is a tendency
of local prosecutors favoring local copyright owners).
214. See June Park, Striking the Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement: The
Case of Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and US-Northeast
Asian Economic Relations, OPEN FORUM May-June 2016, Vol.4, No. 3 (August 18,
2015), http://www.theasanforum.org/striking-the-twenty-first-century-trade-agree
ment-the-case-of-ip-in-the-tpp-and-us-northeast-asian-economic-relations/
(investigating the complexities in implementing the IP chapter of the TPP with
respect to U.S. relations with Japan, South Korea, and China).
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any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of
barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their
abuse.215

A number of TRIPS provisions also allow for recovery by a
defendant who suffers harm as a result of abuse of process. The most
important provision in this context is Article 48, which provides that:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party at whose
request measures were taken and who has abused enforcement procedures
to provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate
compensation for the injury suffered because of such abuse. The judicial
authorities shall also have the authority to order the applicant to pay the
defendant expenses, which may include appropriate attorney’s fees.216

Abuse of process, like fair trial or due process, is a dynamic
concept that is developed through application to particular sets of
facts arising in particular proceedings. TRIPS expert and IP professor
Daniel Gervais identifies a number of actions that might count as
abuse of process: strategic lawsuits to gain an illegal or unfair
advantage, or using procedures primarily for the purposes of
obtaining information, or to force a settlement of an action where the
other party cannot financially sustain the action.217 Other uses of
215. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1.
216. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 48 (providing for compensation, but notably
lacking a requirement that a right vests in victims of enforcers before claiming
against an enforcer who has abused enforcement procedures, unlike the 23 July
1990 draft (W/76) of Article 48); see also Gervais, supra note 116, at 460
(highlighting that the choice of the descriptor ‘abusive’ cases rather than
‘unfounded’ cases, especially in light of the use of the descriptor ‘wrongful’ in
other TRIPS articles, confines the application of Article 48 such that even a
defendant that ultimately defeats the plaintiff is not by default entitled to Article 48
protection).
217. See Gervais, supra note 116, at 460 (explaining that abuse of procedures
occurs when the circumstances and facts available to the plaintiff show that there
has been a serious departure from reasonable use of the legal process); see also
Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478 (UK) (discussing the notion that
bringing proceedings for an ulterior, collateral advantage constitutes an abuse of
process); see also Williams v. Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 (Austl.) (discussing
whether bringing a case for an ulterior motive may be an abuse of process and thus
undeserving of a decision on the merits); see generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 21,
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enforcement procedures have been identified by domestic courts as
abuses of process and may (on further research) provide a longer
list.218
Proving abuse of process can be a challenge; for example, in
Anglo-Australian jurisdictions courts the heavy onus of proving a
collateral purpose lies on the party alleging it.219 However, TRIPS at
least makes it clear that judicial authorities must have the power to
act and compensate a wronged party. While Article 48 is concerned
with compensation, other responses are available to courts where
processes are being abused.220 Furthermore, it is common at a
domestic level for courts to stay proceedings found to be an abuse of
process; alternatively, a court in a jurisdiction that applies the
English loser-pays rule regarding legal costs might deny recovery of
costs to a plaintiff that has engaged in abuse.
The U.S. bilateral trade agreements of the 2000s tended to not
include any references to abuse by IP owners or how States might
respond to them. The obligation to implement procedures in a way
that provides for safeguards against abuse is, however, part of the EU
IP Enforcement Directive, and of ACTA and the TPP.221

at 289-91 (providing first-person insight on the TRIPS negotiation proceedings
particularly regarding forthcoming problems with enforcement, criminal
jurisdiction, and civil and administrative remedies).
218. E.g., Jones v. Sutton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 203 (Austl.) (considering
proceedings an abuse of process where parties sought to relitigate matters already
finally determined by a court and limiting the recovery costs in abuse of process
cases where the judgment amount and the cost of proceedings is significantly
disproportionate); see Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478, 496 (UK)
(finding abuse of process where parties seek to litigate a patent that will inevitably
be held invalid).
219. Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478 (UK); Williams v. Spautz
(1992) 174 CLR 509 (Austl.).
220. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 48 (stating that parties who have abused
enforcement procedures may be ordered to compensate the injured party who was
wrongfully enjoined or restrained, including defendant expenses).
221. See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 3(2) (obliging Member
States to provide safeguards against the abuse of measures, procedures, and
remedies); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6(1) (requiring procedures be
applied “in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse”); see also TPP, supra note 25,
art. 18.71 (mirroring the language of ACTA and directing parties provide
safeguards against abuse of procedures).
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IV. TRENDS IN RELATION TO SAFEGUARDS,
AND THE LEGAL (AND OTHER) IMPLICATIONS
OF THOSE TRENDS
In Part III, I identified and analyzed a series of safeguards in
TRIPS and certain recent international instruments dealing with IP
enforcement: both those that specifically limit the availability of
processes or remedies, and those which empower States to actively
frame procedures and remedies in order to achieve policy goals.
These safeguards provide scope, to protect the rights and interests of
individuals and companies that are objected to IP enforcement
procedures, and, potentially, to promote underlying policy goals of
IP rights, including user interests. In the course of that discussion, I
noted that certain of these safeguards appeared to be under pressure,
or were absent from one international text or another. I turn now to
mapping these trends, and analyzing their legal effects.

A. NOW YOU SEE THEM, NOW YOU DON’T: THE AMAZING
DISAPPEARING SAFEGUARDS

The best way to illustrate the changing position on defendant
safeguards is visually. ANNEXURE 1 tabulates the trends, and makes
for a striking picture.
First, it demonstrates the extensive and detailed set of safeguards
found in TRIPS. In academic writing about TRIPS, the enforcement
provisions of TRIPS have often been remarked upon for their
inclusion of detailed and strong procedures and remedies. As noted
earlier in this paper, the inclusion of these provisions represented a
significant departure from past treaties on IP protection, and an
unusual incursion by an international law treaty into domestic court
processes. What is less often the subject of comment is the way
TRIPS mandates a reasonably comprehensive set of procedural
safeguards, with rights to be notified of the basis of claims, rights to
present evidence, to be heard, to be represented by legal counsel, and
to appeal decisions on the merits.222 As this article has outlined,
TRIPS’ safeguards are stated both at the level of principle, and in

222. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 21 (constituting an exception to this
general rule in the literature, and discussing safeguards built into TRIPS by
design).
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very detailed and specific form. Subject to comments below
regarding TRIPS’ more extreme remedies, TRIPS is conspicuously
less interventionist when it comes to limiting remedies; for example,
TRIPS leaves room for limits without mandating even basic
considerations, such as proportionality except in certain confined
circumstances or protection for innocent infringers (although there is
nothing to stop a State considering such issues, especially given the
significant discretion reserved to States in the application of
remedies, as opposed to their availability).
Equally striking is the absence of safeguards in AUSFTA, which
acts here as an exemplar of the U.S. model bilateral agreement.223
Admittedly, the AUSFTA section on enforcement is far from
comprehensive; it contains no provision, for example, to require the
presence of injunctions as a remedy. It would appear that, perhaps
unlike later agreements like ACTA or the TPP, it did not aim at
covering the field, but rather was focused on elaborations of
particular articles of interest to the United States.224 But it does set
out a range of procedures and remedies, and includes only a very
limited number of TRIPS safeguards, such as the requirement of
evidence and security to support both provisional and border
measures.225 Overall, AUSFTA clearly deserves its reputation as a
text aimed almost exclusively at the interests of right holders. This
becomes even more striking when AUSFTA is compared side by
side with the contemporaneous EU IP Enforcement Directive, which
also aimed to raise and harmonize enforcement standards. By
contrast with AUSFTA, the Directive contains an extensive set of
safeguards, including TRIPS safeguards, and even expands on the
TRIPS model by imposing some limits on remedies, particularly the

223. I have not drawn a detailed comparison of the different U.S. trade
agreements from the period 2000–2015 in order to determine (a) whether there has
been any significant evolution in the U.S. model, or (b) whether individual
countries incorporated additional safeguards into enforcement provisions in their
negotiations with the United States. A full comparison is beyond the scope of this
paper.
224. See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11 (requiring civil and criminal
remedies including compensation for right holders, seizure of infringing goods,
imprisonment, and monetary fines high enough to deter future infringement).
225. See id. arts. 17.11.17, 17.11.19-20 (qualifying said requirements in that
they shall not unreasonably block applicant’s recourse to procedures).
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requirement that they be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.226
ACTA and the TPP are interesting because they represent
enforcement texts heavily influenced by U.S. demands, but in
circumstances of plurilateral negotiations where American
preferences were inevitably less likely to prevail. ACTA involved the
EU, United States, and Japan as demandeurs of stronger procedures
and remedies; the TPP included Japan and the United States, but not
Europe.227 Looking at the table, the TPP includes a wide range of
safeguards not found in past U.S. bilateral models, most of which
have an equivalent in ACTA; in other words, we can clearly see the
influence of ACTA in the TPP.228 Perhaps the most interesting
developments lie in areas where ACTA safeguards are not found in
the TPP: representing areas where U.S. demands were perhaps more
pressing, or the absence of the EU was important. For example,
where the ACTA applies the principle of proportionality to
‘measures, remedies, and penalties,’ the TPP applies it only to
remedies and penalties.229 This is an unfortunate retreat, given that
there is no doubt that procedures, equally with remedies and
penalties, can be disproportionate.230 Although not considered in
226. See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 3 (specifying that remedies
must be applied without raising barriers to trade).
227. See Emily Ayoob, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 176 (2011) (recounting the history
of ACTA negotiations including EU, Japan, and United States influences); see also
Taylor Washburn, Getting Copyright Right in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 7
YALE J. INT’L AFF. 117, 117 (2012) (listing then current members and likely new
members, including the United States and Japan but excluding the EU).
228. See infra annexure 1. This does not reflect any kind of change of heart by
the US, whose early (leaked) proposals for the TPP did not include most of these
safeguards but were based on the old U.S. bilateral model. Other countries,
however, including Australia and New Zealand, appear to have drawn on the
ACTA text during negotiations. See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6(3) (mirroring the
language of the TPP directing the parties to take into account the seriousness of the
infringement, interest of third parties, and applicable measures, remedies, and
penalties); see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71(5) (mirroring the language of
ACTA directing parties to take into account the seriousness of the infringement,
interest of third parties, and applicable measures, remedies, and penalties).
229. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71(5) (stating as a general obligation that
each Party should consider proportionality between the infringement and the
applicable remedy and penalty).
230. Indeed, the right of information (TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47) is one of the
few provisions in TRIPS to consider proportionality – and it is neither penalty nor
remedy, but better described as a ‘measure’.
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detail here, the expansion of criminal liability in the TPP compared
to ACTA is also striking – and problematic.231
The legal effect of failing to include mandatory TRIPS safeguards
in these later instruments is limited.232 Many of the TRIPS safeguards
omitted from the TPP text are mandatory rules in TRIPS,233 so they
bind TPP parties despite their non-inclusion in the TPP text.234 In
addition, TRIPS obligations generally are explicitly reaffirmed in the
TPP,235 ACTA,236 and EU Directive.237 These later instruments
expand the set of cases where remedies and procedures may apply:
for example, from counterfeiting/piracy cases to all IP infringement
cases; or from commercial scale infringement to all commercial
infringement. They also elaborate on considerations relevant to the
award of damages (such as consideration of retail price); and, in the
case of seizure, expand the range of money and materials that can be
seized or forfeited. But they cannot contract defendant safeguards.
It is, nevertheless, odd that the safeguards have not been included
in later texts. After all, many provisions from TRIPS are repeated
across the instruments, and the imbalance in which provisions are
and are not repeated is striking: exclusive rights are repeated;
defendant and other third party protections are not. There is a striking
contrast, too, with the EU IP Enforcement Directive, which includes,
and even expands on, the TRIPS safeguards. It is legitimate to be

231. See also Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup
of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 21, 25 (2013) (arguing that some requirements that provide for
overbroad criminal remedies in the TPP and ACTA would punish even legitimate
conduct).
232. See Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text, supra note 30, at 259-60
(discussing the debate on this point).
233. See infra annexure 1.
234. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 1.2. (recognizing and affirming the parties’
intentions and obligations to coexist with existing international agreements).
235. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 1.2 (affirming explicitly each Party’s ‘rights
and obligations with respect to the other Parties . . . in relation to existing
international agreements to which all Parties are party, including the WTO
Agreement’).
236. See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 1 (emphasizing that obligations of Parties
within ACTA shall not derogate those within existing agreements).
237. See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 2.3(b) (noting specifically
that the Directive shall not affect “Member States’ international obligations,
notably the TRIPS Agreement”).

(DO NOT DELETE)

270

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[32:1

concerned that when it comes to safeguards, out of sight is out of
mind. In the absence of the TRIPS protections, the later instruments
might be interpreted as overriding them, or simply forgotten by
States focused on the newest and most detailed rules.

B. TENUOUS PROTECTION
A second theme to emerge from the discussion above, and
annexure 1 below, is that the international instruments provide
principles that will enable the safeguard of defendant interests – but
do not ensure such a result. The international instruments state
principles of fairness, and frame most procedures and remedies to
allow for decision-maker discretion in their application. Whether
defendant users are treated fairly and equitably in practice, however,
will depend on how that discretion is exercised. We are unlikely to
see, and likely do not want, more detailed guidance on the exercise
of discretion in the treaties themselves. Respect for differences in
system of justice, and the need to ensure room for dynamic
development of concepts of fair trial and due process, limits our
ability to usefully draft more specific protections for international
instruments. The implication, nevertheless, is that we need to think
about how else we can seek to inform the exercise of that discretion.
This paper is itself a partial response. Mapping the safeguards that
protect, or could protect, defendant interests in international
instruments is one step towards defending the interests of users as the
prospective or actual objects of legal procedures. Hopefully, such
elaborations can assist court systems with less experience. Where
particular remedies are new, the mapping presented here could assist
local legislatures, executive, and courts by providing guidance on
some of the issues that can arise in relation to certain remedies.
Further elaboration on safeguards could also help where States are
under pressure to increase action against IP infringement. The United
States has a history in trade negotiations of seeking guarantees from
other States, that certain remedies are not only available, but also
applied in practice.238 The articulation of internationally accepted

238. See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.117(b) (providing a striking textual
example that allows Australia to eschew statutory damages, but also states that ‘if
such additional damages . . . are not regularly awarded in proceedings involving
deliberate acts of infringement where needed to deter infringement, that Party shall
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limiting principles is one tool for assisting States to withstand this
kind of pressure. 239
A second key source of guidance in this respect is the actions and
applications of rules at a domestic level. The more we unearth and
highlight the measured approach real courts often take in the pursuit
of justice and fairness, the more we can develop a narrative
protective of defendant and user interests. Ideally, this will help
counter a one-eyed ‘policing and deterrence’ narrative that otherwise
dominates international and policymaker discussion, and empower
other courts and decision-makers to focus on a fair trial and due
process.

C. EXCEPTIONAL OR ORDINARY?
A final discernible evolution is the way that newer international
instruments are arguably normalizing remedies which, in TRIPS,
were exceptional and draconian.240 One example of this trend is the
promptly ensure that such damages are regularly awarded or establish a system of
pre-established damages’ (emphasis added)).
239. There are limits to this argument. Excepting perhaps within the EU via a
claim concerning compliance with the EU IP Enforcement Directive, it would be
difficult to enforce a State’s obligation to provide sufficiently ‘fair’ IP enforcement
procedures. It would be similarly difficult to claim that a State had been too harsh
on defendants, unless such harshness was somehow coupled with a claim for
nationality-based discrimination. See US-China Panel Report, supra note 75, at ¶
7.513 (emphasizing what is already clear from the text of TRIPS: that the
enforcement provisions of TRIPS give considerable leeway to States in
implementation); see also Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶¶ 215-16,WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Havana Club] (defining ‘available’ as ‘having access’ and
acknowledging the wide variety of civil judicial procedures among Members).
240. This assertion begs the question what remedies or procedures would count
as ‘extraordinary’. It is not possible here to elaborate further on exactly which
remedies or procedures are extraordinary, or not, since such an assertion requires
far more detailed engagement with domestic developments in a range of
jurisdictions both in IP and beyond. However, provisional measures (discussed
here) are not the only remedies or procedures provided for in various international
IP instruments that may warrant designation as ‘exceptional.’ Pre-fixed damages,
also known as statutory damages may be another example of a fairly
‘extraordinary’ remedy. A brief review of the U.S. Code suggests that such
damages are relatively rare and more commonly set at a much lower level than is
found in the U.S. Copyright Act. However, further research and comparisons with
other countries are required to confirm this. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 504
(1976) (defining ‘copyright’ and prefixing damages ranging from $100 to
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provisions relating to provisional measures. It is widely
acknowledged that provisional measures warrant particular scrutiny,
especially when they involve the seizure of alleged infringing goods
or other evidence. Such orders have the potential to be especially
disruptive to affected businesses, and, if granted ex parte, are open to
abuse.241
Article 50 TRIPS requires that judges have authority to order
‘prompt and effective’ provisional measures to preserve evidence,
and to prevent infringement.242 Article 50 does not in terms state that
such measures (or any subset of them) are confined to extreme cases.
But the text is hedged about with restrictions and safeguards which
strongly suggest that the remedy, especially when ordered inaudita
altera parte, is to be considered exceptional. The applicant for a
measure can be required to provide evidence, not just of
infringement, but enough for judges to satisfy themselves of
imminent infringement ‘with a sufficient degree of certainty.’243 The
applicant can be required to provide security ‘sufficient to protect the
defendant and to prevent abuse.’244 The defendant has a right to a
review, measures must cease to have effect if proceedings are not
initiated, and there is provision for compensation for any injury. 245 In
relation to orders inaudita altera parte, TRIPS identifies limited
circumstances where this might be appropriate: ‘where any delay is
likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is
a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.’246

$150,000).
241. See Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben [1992] 1 WLR 840 (UK)
(finding that an injunction restraining a defendant from dealing with customers
when there was a misuse of information should not go beyond what is required to
protect the plaintiff); see also Columbia Picture Indus. Inc. v. Robinson [1987] Ch
38 (UK) (emphasizing that ex parte applications for an Anton Piller order requires
disclosure of all relevant matters); see also Lock Int’l Plc. v. Beswick [1989] 1
WLR 1268 (UK) (holding that an employer must be specific as to the range of
what is being protected as a trade secret when it seeks to prevent a former
employee using information obtained during his employment).
242. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.3 (specifying that authorities may require
applicants produce any readily available evidence to show infringement or
imminent infringement, to provide security, and to prevent abuse).
243. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.3.
244. See id.
245. See id. arts. 50.4–50.8.
246. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.2.
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By contrast, Article 18.75 of the TPP is much less hedged about.
The TPP requires that ‘Each Party’s authorities shall act on a request
for relief in respect of an intellectual property right inaudita altera
parte expeditiously.’247 Unlike TRIPS, the TPP does not make any
mention when such orders might be appropriate. Judicial authorities
may require evidence and security against harm, although in the TPP,
the security ‘shall not unreasonably deter recourse to those
procedures.’248 But none of the other safeguards are present in the
TPP: no right of review; no requirement that the measures be
revoked or cease to have effect; no provision to grant defendants
compensation.249 Further, the TPP text explicitly requires that judicial
authorities have the power to order the most extreme version of a
provisional order to preserve evidence or prevent infringement,
which is not required by TRIPS: the provisional ex parte order for
seizure or other taking into custody of suspected infringing goods,
materials and implements relevant to the infringement, and
documentary evidence relevant to the infringement.250
A similar evolution may be seen in the provisions on border
measures. Border interception in defense of private rights is

247. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.1.
248. See id. art. 18.75.2.
249. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3 (lacking said safeguards with author
suggesting that the power to order compensation to a wrongly restrained defendant
is implicit in the provision of security. If this were true, however, TRIPS would
then not require reference to compensation, since TRIPS also includes the potential
for the court to require security sufficient to protect the defendant’s interests). cf.
ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12 (falling somewhere between TRIPS and the TPP by
retaining more of TRIPS safeguards but adding some of the TPP qualifications.
ACTA art. 12 specifies when provisional measures might be appropriate and also
provides for compensation to a defendant where no infringement is subsequently
found. But, like the TPP, it also requires that the provision of security should not
deter recourse to provisional measures, and does not make provision for revocation
of provisional measures within any fixed period).
250. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3; see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50
(missing specific reference to impoundment of infringing goods and implements. It
is perhaps arguable that such orders could fall within the concept of measures to
preserve evidence, in which case the various safeguards provided within article 50
would apply. However, TRIPS art. 50 would be satisfied if a member state granted
courts the power to order a party to retain or not destroy or not sell infringing
material: such a limited approach to the preservation of evidence would not satisfy
the TPP); compare ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12.3 (which has similar drafting to
the TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3).
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unusual,251 and the TRIPS provisions on border measures252 are
confined to trademark counterfeit goods and copyright piracy.253 A
right holder applicant must be required to provide ‘adequate’
evidence of prima facie infringement,254 and can be required to
provide security sufficient to protect the defendant and the competent
authorities and to prevent abuse.255 TRIPS states that proceedings on
the merits must be commenced within a particular time period256 and
that there must be provision for compensation to importers and
others harmed by suspension of goods.257
251. Impoundment of goods at the border to enforce private rights is rare: in
fact, in Australia this only occurs in relation to certain kinds of intellectual
property. Seizure and impoundment at the border does occur to enforce public laws
in Australia: seizure of goods without a warrant is allowed. See Customs Act 1901,
§ 203CB (Cth) (Austl.) (allowing seizure of goods without a warrant); see also
Customs Act 1901, § 183UA (including narcotic goods, prohibited psychoactive
substances, and prohibited serious drug alternatives); see also Customs Act 1901, §
203 (including alleged IP infringements as goods that may be seized without a
warrant on the basis of a Notice of Objection lodged with customs); Customs Act
1901, § 203B (relating to ‘special forfeited goods’); see also Customs Act 1901, §
203C (relating to narcotic goods, giving some indication of the kinds of serious
infractions that can lead to instant, ex officio, and warrantless seizure by customs);
see also Customs Act 1901, § 203T (including moveable cultural property among
other provisions allowing for seizure). What is striking about these provisions is
the seriousness of the offenses that may lead to seizure of goods at the border: in
allowing for such a remedy, IP law is placed in company with drug and national
security offences and special cases like cultural property: see generally Annemarie
Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy,
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683 (2014) (discussing another link between IP enforcement and
drug enforcement).
252. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 51–60.
253. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 51 (noting that Members are allowed to
extend the measures beyond these cases and to other IP rights, provided similar
safeguards are provided); see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 53 (qualifying this rule
by providing that goods allegedly infringing on designs, patents, layout designs or
trade secrets must be released after a certain period unless a judge makes the order
requiring their continued suspension).
254. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 52 (requiring further that a right holder
provide detail description of goods making them readily recognizable by customs
authorities).
255. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 53.
256. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 55 (limiting detention of goods to ten days,
with a possible extension of ten more days, when proceedings leading to a decision
on the merits have not been initiated).
257. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 56 (giving relevant authorities the power to
order indemnification of importer and owner of goods following a wrongful
detention of goods).
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Again, the TPP text has ‘evolved’ from TRIPS. The TPP extends
such measures to cases of trade mark infringement, not only
counterfeiting.258 The TRIPS requirement that proceedings on the
merits be commenced within a particular timeframe is not included.
Although the TPP is more specific on what may be done with
infringing goods, including destruction, plus mechanisms for
administrative penalties or sanctions including fines,259 there is no
reference to compensation for a wronged importer or consignee. The
non-inclusion of a series of safeguards in the TPP text changes the
tone of the provision entirely, and communicates the impression, at
least, that remedies of this kind should be considered an ordinary tool
within the enforcement toolkit available to a right holder. This is
undesirable if we wish to ensure that exceptional remedies are
applied with care, and appropriate safeguards.260 The evolution of IP
enforcement provisions may make this harder – while these
exceptional remedies are heavily qualified in TRIPS, the
disappearance of safeguards highlighted above tends to detract from
any suggestion that certain remedies might not be appropriate in the
ordinary case.

V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to explore user interests beyond the usual
focus on exceptions and limitations, delving into the apparently
prosaic area of remedies and procedure. As I have argued, if we wish
to promote user interests within IP systems, we must engage equally
across the full range of issues in the IP system – including
enforcement. These aspects of the legal system will affect whether
users can fight for their rights, or must rationally fold at the threat of
litigation. I have also identified and analyzed the various safeguards
258. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.76.1 (requiring Parties to provide
applications to suspend or detain suspected counterfeit or confusingly similar
imported mark or good).
259. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.76.6-7 (requiring parties to authorize
administrative penalties and destruction of goods upon a determination of
infringing goods).
260. See Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 284, 307 (2015) (recommending that U.S. legislation
specifically provide that certain ex parte seizure provisions are extraordinary,
while simultaneously arguing that ex parte seizure for alleged trade secrets
breaches are inappropriate).
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found in certain key international IP instruments, and mapped their
development over time. The overall picture is a complex one. There
is certainly a very strong foundation for due process and appropriate
and just remedies laid out in TRIPS; many of the procedural
safeguards are mandatory and hence persist despite TRIPS’
displacement with bilateral and plurilateral agreements, and both
States and courts have the freedom within the architecture of the
provisions to frame remedies in a way that promotes the full range of
IP policy goals. However, there are also risks; for example, that
safeguards will not be used out of neglect, intimidation or
contestation from IP owner stakeholders, or simple lack of
awareness, or even that States will fail to take full advantage of the
flexibilities in enforcement just as too many have in the enactment of
substantive IP law post-TRIPS. I hope that this paper will be one
small contribution to ensure that this part of the flexibility of the IP
system is remembered, used, and further developed.
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ANNEXURE 1: CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF
DEFENDANT SAFEGUARDS IN INTERNATIONAL
IP ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS
Notes:
Numbers indicate the articles/provisions where relevant safeguards
may be found. A dash indicates that the safeguard is not present.
* indicates a safeguard which is mandatory in TRIPS. ‘Mandatory’
includes where TRIPS requires that judicial or other authorities ‘shall
have authority’ to make certain orders.
SAFEGUARD

TRIPS
(1995)

AUSFTA
(2004)

IPRED (2004)

ACTA
(2010)

TPP
(2015)

-

Innovation (no ref
to technology

2.3 (incorporates
TRIPS art. 7)

18.2

2.3 (incorporates
TRIPS art. 8.1).
Also Doha
Declaration
recognized in
Preamble.

18.3.
Also art 18.6
recognizes
Doha
Declaration.

INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES
Objective that
enforcement
should contribute
to promotion of
innovation and
technology transfer

7

Members may
adopt measures to
protect public
health and
nutrition

8.1

261

transfer)
Recital 1, art 18

-

262

-

261. Reference to technology transfer is clearly less critical and appropriate
within the EU, which is comprised of developed countries.
262. Concerns about public health are ordinarily more associated with
developing countries (such as, for example, via the Doha Declaration). See Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights] (simply stating that intellectual
property shall be protected without mentioning safeguards); see also EU Directive
2004/48, supra note 22, ¶ 32 (aligning with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union with respect to intellectual property specifically).

(DO NOT DELETE)

10/13/2016 4:27 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

278
Recognize the
need to facilitate
diffusion of
information,
knowledge,
technology, culture
and the arts

-

-

[32:1

-

-

18.4

Recognizing the
principles of
transparency and
due process
Taking into
account interests of
relevant
stakeholders,
including right
holders, service
providers, users
and the public
FAIR AND EQUITABLE PROCEDURES GENERALLY
Fair and equitable
41.2
IP enforcement
procedures*
Decisions on
41.3
17.11.29
merits in writing
and reasoned
Decisions based
41.3
only on evidence
on which parties
are heard*
Review of
41.4, 50.4, 55
Appeal from refusals
decisions (judicial/
to register TM only:
administrative)*
17.2.7

-

-

18.4

-

Some reference
to interests of
third parties and
consumers:
recital 24

18.4

3.1

6.2

18.71.3

-

-

18.73.1

-

-

-

7 (measures to
preserve evidence),
9 (prov. measures)

-

Written and timely
notice of the basis
of the claims*
Right to
independent legal
counsel*

42

-

-

-

Appeal from
refusals to
register TM
only: 18.23(d)
-

42

-

EU Charter of
Fundamental

-

-

Right to
substantiate claims
and present
evidence*
Production of
evidence to the

42

-

Rights
art. 47
-

-

-

43.1

-

-

-

-

263

263. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (stating the
fundamental rights protected in the EU. The Charter was proclaimed in 2000, and
became legally binding on the EU with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,
in December 2009. The Charter applies when EU countries adopt or apply a
national law implementing an EU directive, including the IP Enforcement
Directive. The Charter is referred to in Recital 32 of the IP Enforcement
Directive).
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other side*
Proportionality of
procedures

Only in 47
(right of
information)
LIMITS ON REMEDIES (GENERAL)
Limits on
44.2
availability of
injunctions where
injunction is
inconsistent with
Member’s law
Proportionality of
Only in 46, in
remedies (at least a application
consideration)
(destruction of
implements)
Requirement that
41.1
remedies/
procedures be

279

-

Required: 3.2

Considered: 6.3

-

n/a
(no requirement re
injunctions)

-

8

18.74.2

-

Required in
application: 3.2

Considered in
implementing:
6.3

Considered in
implementing:
18.71.5

-

Required in
application: 3.2

6.1

18.71.1

17.11.12 only
(sanctions for
violation of orders
protecting
confidentiality)
17.11.10
Use in creation &
manufacture, not
predominant use. But
for © piracy and TM
counterfeiting only

6, 7, 8

4, 11, 22

18.74.13,
18.74.14,
18.76.4.

10
principle use in
creation &
manufacture only,
but all IPR
infringements

10
predominant use
only; pirated
copyright and
TM
counterfeiting
only

18.74.12
any use in
creation or
creation of
infringing
goods, any IPR

17.11.17

9.3

12.4

18.75.2

17.11.17

9.6

12.4

18.75.2

-

7.3, 9

-

-

-

7.4, 9.7

12.5

Compensation
only for abuse

264

effective
Protection for
privacy /
confidentiality

42, 43, 57

Seizure of
46
materials &
implements used in
infringement –
only where
predominantly
used in creation of
infringing goods
PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Court power to
50.3
require sufficient
evidence before
order made*
Court power to
50.3
require security to
prevent abuse and
protect defendant*
Requirement that
50.6
provisional
measures expire if
proceedings not
pursued within 20
working days*
Compensation for
50.7
costs or harms

264. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1 (stating “Members shall ensure that
enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as
to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement”. ‘Effective’ here is both a required (effective
enforcement must be provided for) but also a limit (Parties would not be required,
under this provision, to provide remedies or procedures that would be futile)).
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caused by
provisional
remedies *
BORDER MEASURES
Required only for
51
counterfeit TM and
pirated copyright
goods

Authorities must
require sufficient
evidence before
seizure*
Authorities’ power
to require security
to prevent abuse
and protect owner/
importer of goods*
Requirement that
border measures
expire if
proceedings not
commenced within
10 days
(extendable once)*
Compensation for
costs or harms
caused by border
measures*

[32:1
of procedure:
18.74.15.

17.11.19
Extended also to TM
infringement

EU Customs
Regulation 4
available for
infringement of all
IPRs

13
Extended, with
parties required
not to
‘discriminate
unjustifiably’
between IPRs
17.1

18.76
Extended also
to TM
infringement

52

17.11.19

EU Customs
Regulation 6, 17

53

17.11.20

EU Customs
Regulation 6.3(o)
undertaking

18

18.76.3

55

-

EU Customs
Regulation 23.3–

-

-

-

-

2.3 (incorporates
TRIPS art. 8)

18.3.2

18.76.2

265

23.5

56

-

EU Customs
266

Regulation 28;
also 30 (penalties)

ABUSE
Recognition of
possible need for
State action to
prevent abuse of

8.2

-

-

267

rights

265. Note that the EU Customs Regulation has an additional step however: once
goods are seized, the importer/owner is notified and must, within 10 days, notify
customs of their objection to destruction. If they fail to do so they may be deemed
to have consented to destruction without any determination of infringement:
23.1(c).
266. Within the EU IP Border Measures are dealt with via regulations separate
to the EU IP Enforcement Directive: Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning customs
enforcement of Intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC)
No 1383/2003, OJ L 181/15 (29.6.2013).
267. Note that it is not surprising that abuse of right does not form part of
instruments concerned chiefly with enforcement, such as the EU IP Enforcement
Directive.
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Reference to action
to prevent abuse of
procedures/
process*
Compensation for
abuse of
procedures*
CRIMINAL LAW
Limits on
applicability of
criminal law:
willful,
commercial scale
copyright piracy
and TM
counterfeiting only
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41, also 63, 67

-

3.2

6.1

18.71.1

48

-

-

-

18.74.15

61

17.11.26
extended to
significant noncommercial
infringement, and any
commercial
infringement

[not addressed]

23
extended to
commercial
activities for
direct or indirect
economic or
commercial
advantage

18.77
extended to
acts for
commercial
purposes, and
significant
noncommercial
acts with
substantial
prejudicial
impact

